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T H E
Christians rescue
FROM THE
GRAND ERROR
of the H E A T H E N,

(touching the *fatal Necessity of all Events*)

A N D
The *Dismal consequences* thereof, which
have *slyly* crept into the C H U R C H.

In several Defences
Of some Notes, writ to Vindicate the
Primitive and Scriptural Doctrine
of Gods Decrees.

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~~Angl~~ L O N D O N, *Sept 1st*
Printed by J. G. for Richard Royston, at the Angel
in Ivy-lane. 1 6 5 8.



The general Preface to the ensuing Tracts.

1.



cannot but think it very expedient, and very agreeable to Reason, that Altercations and *Controversies* in every kind, those especially in *Religion*, should be made to acknowledge their mortality, as well as the *Controversers themselves*, by whom the dissensions are kept *alive*. This, concerning Gods *Decrees of Reward and Punishment*, as it is much *stricken in years*, and even decrepitly *aged*; so (by the blessing of God) it is drawing the faster towards its *end* too. The *Erroneous side* of the controversy is, grown so feeble and *dispirited*, what with its *wounds and bruises*, and *putrifying sores* (which in its desperate *encounters* it hath received) and is become so *gastrly* to lookers on, that even they who are *ashamed* to see it *falling*, are more *ashamed* to *hold it up*.

2. There is not sure a more *effectual* or *shorter* course for the putting a *period* to a *Dispute*, then by proceeding from such *principles*, as are assented to, and granted, by men of *all sides*.

3. There are not any *two Principles* more universally received throughout the world, then that *God is the Author of every thing that is good*, and that *he cannot be the Author of any thing that is evil*, (I mean the evil of *sin*, which is properly *evil in it self*; for the evil of *punishment* is *in it self* very good, and doth onely *seem evil* to them that *suffer it*.)

4. In these preceding Considerations, I began to reason on those *two* * *grounds*. And supposing my self to be of *neither*, or at least of *both parties*, I was resolved

* *Correct Copy of Notes. p. 6.*

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to state the Question between *me* and *my self*, as I should finally be conducted by those *infallible guides*; religiously intending to go *as far*, and withal resolving to go *no farther*, then those *granted Maxims* should either *carry* or *allow* me.

† Note, that though they often make God the *Author of sin*, and use that word, as well as worse, yet they often confess it to be *blasphemy*; which makes me say they have not dared to deny my *principle*, because when they have, they have not dared to stand to it, but have rather denied their own *hand-writing*.

5. I have had the happiness to observe, that *none* of those whom I displeased in the course I took, have either dared (in † plain terms) to deny the *truth* of my *Principles*, or adventured to discover wherein my *deductions* could seem *illegal*; but only talking at *Rovers*, they have largely expressed their *dislikes*, without exhibiting to the Reader a reason *why*, except the *contract* they had made with some *vulgar Errors*, with which my *Principles & Deductions* were very equally *inconsistent*.

6. What deductions *they* have made from *their* fanciful notions of Gods *prescience* and *decrees*, I have abundantly proved to be *blasphemous*. And my proofs have been taken, not from *Scripture only* and *Reason*, and the whole suffrage of *Antiquity*, and the most *eminent* of the *Moderns* for *Life* and *Learning*, but over and above from their *own Confessions*, which in their *sobriest intervals* have happily falne down from their *publick Pens*. So unadvised was * M. Baxter, in charging *Grotius* and others with *uncharitable censures*, and *odious inferences*; for the *odious inferences* are made by his own dear *Brethren* and *Predecessors*, who have avowedly deduced them from those *grounds of Theology* on which they go: whereas *Grotius* and others have but *recited* them to their *Authors* out of their *publick works*.

7. The *head spring* of their *Doctrines* is known by the * *streams* which *issue* from them, as the † *tree* is known by its *fruit*. * It cannot be a *good tree* which bringeth

* *Grot. R lig.*
† *ref. sect 5. p. 5.*

* *Jam. 3. 11.*
† *Mat. 11. 33.*
* *Mat. 7. 18.*

bringeth forth evil fruit: much less is that a good Doctrin, whose very Patrons and Abettors have often acknowledged it doth infer (what a thousand times they have themselves inferred from it) that *God is the natural cause of sin.*

8. The head-spring of their Doctrines is that of *irrespective praedestination*, or *pradetermination* of all events (*antecedent to prae-science.*)

9. If Gods eternal Decrees concerning the final state of man cannot possibly be *absolute*, or *irrespective*, of those respective qualifications by which alone he can be qualified for reward or punishment, it cannot chuse but follow (by the confession of all) that those Decrees are *respective*, or (as some express it) *conditional* (that is) according to Gods prae-science of such and such qualifications. There being clearly no *medium* of participation, or proportion, no nor so much as of *abnegation*, betwixt the *respectiveness* and *irrespectiveness* of the very same act, as they both relate to the very same object. For what implies a *contradiction*, is very happily exploded by men of all sorts; So as the ruine of the one is the establishing of the other. And they that are beaten from the bold of *irrespective praedestination*, must fly to the tenet of the *respective* by way of refuge, there being nothing betwixt them but the pit of *Atheism*.

10. It is confessed by Mr. *Whitfield*, *Wollebius*, and Dr. *Twisse* against *Moulin* (to name no more) that there is parity of reason in the decrees, both of *Election* and *Reprobation*. And the *respectiveness* of the later doth evince the former to be *respective*.

11. That I have spoken on these subjects according to Gods revealed will, and not proceeded a step farther then I was warranted to go by *unavoidable deductions* from clearest Scripture, (not enduring their boldness, who
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interpret Gods revealed word by those *Caprices* of their brains, which they presumptuously call Gods *secret will*, alwayes implying this *contradiction*, that it is *secret* and *not secret*,) the following *Tracts* will make apparent.

Exh 3.6.

Mat. 11.21.

* Deut. 29.29.

12. As for those mysterious Questions, 1. Why the word of God is preached rather to *one* sort of men, then to *another*, and sometimes to a *more impious* people, then those to whom it is *not preached*; 2. Why the means of *conversion & perseverance unto the end* are not afforded alike to all to whom the Gospel is daily preached, and many times in greater measure to an exceedingly evil people then to a people *less evil*; 3. Why some mens lives are *prolonged* to a happy opportunity of *true repentance*; whilst others are speedily cut off (like *Corah* and his complices) in a state of impenitence; I never yet have inquired, I never will.* *The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children.*

13. I shall conclude with an *Admonition* to the unstable and unlearned among the people, that they beware of those Teachers who prefer the *interest* of their *Faction* before the *honour* of their God; and will rather take part with a *Presbyterian*, in making God to be the *Author and cause of sin*, then live in any kind of *charity* with an *Episcopal Divine*, who proves that Doctrine to be *blasphemous*. Some have made themselves *examples* of this prodigious *partiality*; whilst even in Print they have thought it fitter, that a *Brother* of the *Presbytery* should invent strange *slanders* against the *innocent*, then that a man of the *Church of England* should proceed to *conviction* against the *guilty*. It will appear to all Readers, from the *first* to the *last* of these following *Tracts*, that my principal intention hath been to *vindicate my God*, both in his *Essence*, and in his *Attributes*.

buties, from the publick calumnies of evil doers. whilest one doth teach, that God *willeth sin*; and another, that he *ordaines it*; and a third, that it is one of Gods *works*; the desperate sinner is taught to say, [*I have done the will of God, and what God appointed me to do.*]

2. Whilest some affirm, that Gods *willing of sin* doth make it cease to be a *sin*; and others say, he *willeth all sins*; a third sort conclude, that there are *no sins at all*. 3. Whilest they say with eagerness, that *God must be such, or there is no God at all*, they teach as many to be *Atheists* as cannot believe with the *Libertines*, that God *doth will and work sin*. 4. Whilest they say that the *Regenerate* cannot possibly *fall away*, nor become *notoriously ungodly* by their commission of *Crimson and Scarlet sins*, they teach the *Ranters* to live accordingly. I can name the persons who have *taught* such things; and experience hath taught us what they are, who have reduced their knowledge of the several *Lessons* into *Practice*. Towards the remedying of this, I have in singleness of heart considered what should be the *cause*, and (as God hath enabled me) us'd my endeavours to *remove it*. I have been most of all intent upon clearing the *Holiness of God*, that men may think of him with *Reverence*, and *Love unfeigned*. A wrong *apprehension* of the Deity is apt to breed a wrong *worship*; and so I have pitch't upon the subject, wherein it primely concerns us to *set men right*. The *holiness* of God is his *Sovereign Attribute*, and dearer to him then his *power*. The *Cherubims and Seraphims* do *continually cry out* in honour to him, (Not *high, and mighty, and irresistible*, but) *Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts*. As if God esteemed more of *this*, then of *all his Attributes besides*. And Bishop Andrews of precious memory

The general Preface, &c.

memory thought fit to make it his observation, that in God, *Holy Holy*, is before, *Lord of Hosts*. His Holiness first, his Power after.

L May all that hate me upon the earth, but follow the method of the Angels which are in Heaven, speaking so honourably of God to a peevish world, as not to miss of his favour in the word to come; I shall not fail of their Love, and shall receive the best recompence for all my Labour.

Fiat. Fiat.



THO. PIERCE.

Directions for the placing of the ensuing Tracts.

- I. The Correct Copy of Notes.**
- II. The Divine Philanthropie defended.**
- III. The Divine Purity defended, in answer to Dr. Reynolds.**
- IV. The Self-Revenger exemplified in Mr. B.**
- V. Self-Condemnation exemplified in Mr. W. and others.**

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
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A Cor-



A PARÆNESIS to the Reader,

(*shewing the first occasion of this following Discourse, and the Authour's necessity to make it publick.*)

SECT. 1.

THat I am subject to *errours*, it is no *humility* to acknowledge; it being no more than to confesse, that I carry about me the infirmities of a *man*; which whosoever doth not, let him cast the first stone at me. But whether orno I am an *Heretick*, or a *dangerous person*, I desire my *Censors* may be my *Judges*; and do therefore addresse this present *Apologie* and *Appeal*, not to the *kindnesse* and *partiality* of my dearest *friends*, but to the very *jealousies* and *prejudices* of my severest *enemies*. I bar the suffrage of none, but the *accuser of the Brethren*, that *Abaddon* or *Apollyon*, so very skilful to destroy, who is the *Father of Lies*, and was a *murderer from the beginning*.

John 8. 7.

Rev. 12. 10.

9. 11.

Joh. 8. 14, 44.

2. I do professe in the presence of that *punctual Register* within me (to which I bear a greater *reverence* than to *affront* it with a premeditated and *wilful Lie*) that I do not *unsheath* my *Pen*, to wound the *reputation* of any man living. But since mine own lies *bleeding*

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in

in the mouths of *some*, whose very *Tongues* have *Teeth*, which *bite* much *harder* than I will ever allow *mine*, (and if there happen to be any in all my papers, I shall not think it *painful* to have them *drawn*) it is but needfull that I be clothed at least with *armour* of *defence*. I meant indeed at the first, onely to have armed myself with *silence*, that my *reservednesse* and *obscurity* might keep me *safe*: and even now that I am forced, and as it were *dragg'd* into the *field*, I contend not for *victory*, but for an *honourable Retreat*. And if after I have suffer'd, I may be *competently safe*, I will thank my *Buckler*, but not my *Sword*. Even now that I am *writing*, it is with a kind of *willingnesse* to blot it out; and I do onely *so* do it, as preferring an *inconvenience* before a *mischiefe*.

3. There had been a *private conference* betwixt a Gentleman and my self, which (for his further satisfaction) I threw hastily into paper; every whit as *incoherent*, as it had been in our *oral* and *extemporary Discourse*. A Discourse which of necessity was forc'd to be without *method*, as without *premeditation*; because (in my answers to his *objections*.) I was bound to follow, after the measure that I was led. I thought the thing so *inconsiderable*, as not to vouchsafe it a *reading over*; but just as 'twas written, deliver'd it instantly to my friend, to be returned (when he had used it) unto the *usuell place* of my *forgetfulness*. And forgotten it was so long, that truly I know not how long it was; till discoursing with another Gentleman upon the very same subject, I found my memory awak'd by that *sleeping scribble*. But (forgetting that *secrets* do cease to be so, when they are *told*, though but to *one*, and that with

with strict conjurations of greatest *secrecy*) I gave him leave to peruse it as his leisure served him. It seems this Gentleman had a *Confident*, as well as I; and so my *original* increast and multiplied into many false copies, of which *not one* was like the *mother*. Now that my paper went abroad by the help of more *hands* than one, was against my *knowledge*, against my *will*, against my *precept*, against my *care*, and lastly against my *best endeavours* to recall it. It having been absolutely impossible, that I should love the *publication* of my *poor Abortive*, who never esteemed my *ripest* and most *legitimate productions* to be any way worthy of *publick view*. So farre was I from an *ambition* of being known by a *disfigured* and *mis-shapen childe*, that when I first heard of its *travels*, it was fallen out of my *memory*; and when it came to me in a *disguise*, it was quite out of my *knowledge*.

4. I do acknowledge the great *abstruseness* of the whole subject on which I treated, and the *disproportion* of my faculties to undertake or manage it. For if the learned bishop *Andrews* did chuse with Saint *Austin*, much more may I with Bishop *Andrews*, rather to *hear* than to *speak* of these *Insearchables*. I doe not hope to fathom either the *Bathos* of the *Apostle*, or the *Psalmists Abyſſe*. But I expect to be pardoned, if when my way is slippery, I take heed to my *footing*; and so eschew the *precipice*, as not to run upon the *Wolfe*. It is not the businesse of this *paper*, either to state an *old question* in a *new-found way*, or to publish my *judgement*, as a *considerable thing*. Who am I, that I should moderate between the *Remonstrants*, and *Anti-*

Episc. Winton.
in Ind. de art.
Lamb.

Rom. II. 33.
Psal. 36. 6.

remonstrants? betwixt S. *Austin*, and other *Fathers*?
 betwixt *him*, and *himself*? betwixt the *Synod of Dort*,
 and that other at *Augusta*? betwixt the *Dominicans*,
 and the *Iesuites*? *Arminius*, and Mr. *Perkins*? *Twisse*,
 and *Bellarmino*? or betwixt *Whitaker*, and *Baro*? Much
 indeed may be *excus'd*, because much may be *lockt*
 for, from such reverend Prelates, as were *Overal*, and
Davenant. But I believe, amongst the *Clergy*, there
 is not one in a *hundred* fit to *speak* of these *Mysteries*;
 and amongst the *Laity*, not one in a *thousand* that's fit
 to *hear* them. Hence was that *silence* first, and after-
 wards that *secrecie*, wherein I fain would have *buried*
 mine own *conjectures*: and even now that I am *forc'd*
 to be more publick than I *meant*, (by the many *false*
copies of my *discourse*, whereof one of the *falsest* is
 now preparing for the *Presse*, by one, who it seems
 is at very great *leisure*) it is not at all from any *ambiti-*
on to be *followed*, but from an humble *desire* to be
rightly understood; and I therefore onely pretend to
 an *Apologie*, and an *Appeal*. First, an *Apologie* for
 my *imprudence*, that I could think such a secret might
 be communicated to one; and so betray those *papers*
 to the *Light*, which belonged onely to the *Fire*. Se-
 condly, an *Appeal*, whether I am a *Pelagian*, or whe-
 ther so much as a *Masilian*: or whether indeed I am
 not rather a very *Orthodox Protestant* of the *Church*
 of *England*. I have managed my *discourse*, as I ground
 my *Faith*, not from the *hidden Mysteries* of God's
secret will, but from the *clearest expressions* of his *writ-*
ten Word. Where, of *divers* interpretations (as often
 as they are *divers*) I love to pitch upon *that*, which I
 finde

finde agreed upon by the wisest, and the best; and which, in my shallow judgement, (which yet is the deepest that I have) doth seem the safest, and the most sutable to the *Analogie of Faith*. Even *Babes* and *Idiots* have this advantage of their *bettters*, to be afraid of that fire where wiser men have been burnt. And sad experience hath taught me, (who am a *Babe* and an *Idiot* in respect of the *Aged* and the *wise*) to steer aloof in my *Doctrines* from those fatal shelves, whereon my own small vessel hath been soundly dashed, and many others (much greater) as it were shipwracks before mine eyes. This entirely is the reason, why I have hovered a long time betwixt the *Absoluteness* of a *Decree*, and the *Liberty* of a *Will*, like a trembling *Needle* betwixt two *Load-stones*; or rather like a man newly walking upon a *Rope*, who so ballanceth his body with his two hands, that his continuall fear of falling down is the onely *Tenure* by which he stands. I dare not, for my life, be so bold as the *Pelagians*, nor yet so bloudy as the *Manichees*. I would not split my judgement on the *Symplegades* of two intolerable mischiefs, either by robbing God of his *Efficiency*, in any one *Act* which is naturally good; or by aspersing his *Holiness*, in any one *Act* which is morally evil. I do endeavour to keep my self, (and others committed to my keeping) both from the rock of *Presumption*, and from the gulf of *Despair*. I steer as carefully as I can (in this so dangerous *Archipelago*) betwixt the nature of *Gods Will*, and the condition of mine own; that so my *Confidence* may well consist

With my *Humility*. I dare not *impute* to God, what is *unworthy* for him to own; nor *arrogate* to my *self*, what is *Gods peculiar*: and therefore settle my *minde* and my *judgement* upon these *two Grounds*.

The two Principles or Grounds of my Belief in this businesse.

I.

THat all the *Evil* of *sin* which *dwelleth* in me or *proceedeth* from me, is not imputable to Gods *Will*, but entirely to mine *own*. The *Serpent* and the *protoplast* were *promoters* of my guilt, but my *God* was no promoter either of *their* guilt or *mine*. When the *Serpent* speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his *own*; He is the *Father* of lies, and the works of your *father* ye will do, Iohn 8. 44.

II. That all the *good* which I do, I do first receive, not from any thing in my *self*, but from the *special* *Grace* and *favour* of Almighty God, who *freely* worketh in me both to *will* and to *do*, of his good *pleasure*, Phil. 2. 13.



CHAP.

CHAP. I.

3.



IF these are *Principles* to be granted, my work is done; for these are the *Grounds* on which I *build* my judgement, and these are the *Touchstones* by which I try it. Whatsoever I believe concerning *Election* or *Reprobation*, and those other *Questions* which are depending, I doe inferre from these *Truths*, *Sic proponam, sic asseram, ut veritati quæ nec fallit, nec fallitur, semper inhæream, semper obediens*

which (as I suppose) cannot possibly deceive me. And whilst I stand to these *Grounds*, I am not able to quit my judgement, how little soever it shall be liked by such as are wittily unreasonable. So that my *Principles* be right, I care not whether they carry me, whilst *Scripture* and my best *Care* are both *Guides* in my conveyance. For where the *Premisses* are true, the *Conclusion* cannot be false. All that needeth to be cared for in the *progresse* of my search, is the *legality* of the *deduction*: which, if it be wrong, I shal be glad to hear of it for my *instruction*; and if it be right, it cannot chuse but be *Truth*, which leaps naturally forth from the womb of *Truth*. *consentensque reperiar. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1. sub init.*

6. If by any inadvertency (either in me, or the Reader) my words seem to clash with my Belief, it is by no other misfortune than befell S. Austin, when he used such expressions against the *Pelagians*, as seemed to contradict what he had spoken against the *Manichees*; and yet he professeth it was not his judgement, but his style onely that was changed. The saying of *Bucer* is remarkable (and the more, because it was *Bucers*) That there was no such harm in what was said by the learned, both ancient and modern, concerning the freedome of the *VVills*, if things were taken as they were meant (that is to say) by the right handle: and that would oftener be done, if the persons of some men were not a prejudice to their Cause: for I find the same words may pass with favour from one, which would not be endured should they be spoken by another. One short example will not be burdensome to the Reader. Doctor Twisse himself, hath said expressly, That the Justice of God doth not appear in the abso- *Nec inest iis qua de libero arbitrio Patres quidem & Noster astringunt, ea quam olim nonnulli putant impietas, si hac rite modo accipiantur, & sicut ipsi scriptores ea accipi voluerunt.* Apud Cassand. In prefat. ad Inse Vind. Grat. p. 3.

The first principle opposeth

Gal. 6. 1.

late or simple condemnation of his creature, but in the condemnation of it for sin. Thus he speaketh in his Preface, which is most of it spent against *Arminius*. I did but say the same words to some admirers of Dr. *Twisse*, and yet was counted an *Arminian*; which makes me heartily desire that I may meet with *unbiast and impartial Readers*; that whatsoever I shall say in these following papers, may be compared with the two Principles which I have just now laid: I disallowing all that disagreeeth with those principles, as the unhappinesse of my Pen, or the unsteadinesse of my brain. I desire all may goe for no more than it is worth. If I seem to any man to be overtaken in a fault, he shall doe well to restore me in the spirit of meeknesse, remembring himself, lest he also be tempted. If I am thought to be in the wrong, by those that think themselves onely in the right, they can conclude no worse of me, than that I am not infallible: If in any thing I erre, it is for want of apprehension, not my unwillingnesse to apprehend; nor am I severely to be censur'd, for being every whit as dull, as those thousands of thousands, who have thought as I doe. I hope my Reasons will make it appear, that, if I erre, I am not affectedly, but invincibly ignorant; and so for being most unpassionately, I am most pardonably erroneous. Or if I am thought not to be so, I desire one favour from them that so think, even that all my faults (whether real or supposed) may rather be laid upon my person, than imputed to my Cause.

Prov. 19. 3.

7. Before I come to prove any thing from the first of my Principles, I foresee a necessity to prove my Principles to be true: for though the foolishnesse of man perverteth his way, yet his heart fretteth against the Lord. There are men in the world of no small name, who have told the world both out of the Pulpit, and from the Presse, that all the evill of sin, which is in man, proceedeth from God onely as the Author, and from Man onely as the Instrument; whether or no I am deceived, let the Reader judge by this following Catalogue of Expressions. I forbear to name the Authors in meer civility to their persons: But I have them lying by me very particularly quoted, and will produce them, if I am challenged by any man's Doubt, or Curiosity. The Expressions are such as these: (to begin with the mildest.)

• That

Sect. 7. *the frightful Doctrines of some men.*

9

‘That *all things* happen, not onely by Gods *Præscience*, but
 ‘by his expresse *Order* and positive *Decree*. Whereby many
 ‘from the *womb* are devoted to certain and inevitable *Destru-*
 ‘*ction*, that by their misery Gods Name may be glori-
 ‘fied.

‘That God directeth his *voice* to some men, but that they
 ‘may be so much the *deaf*; he gives *light* unto them, but
 ‘that they may be so much the *blinder*; he offers them *instru-*
 ‘*ction*, but that they may be the more *ignorant*; and he useth a
 ‘*remedy*, but to the end they may not be *healed*.

‘That a wicked man, by the *just impulse* of God, doth that
 ‘which is not *lawful* for him to do.

L. 1. c. 18.
 Sect. 4. p. 71.

‘That the Devil and wicked men are so *restrained* on every
 ‘side with the *hand* of God, as with a *bridle*, that they cannot
 ‘conceive, nor contrive, nor execute any *mischiefe*, nor so much
 ‘as endeavour its execution, any farther than God himself doth
 ‘(not permit onely, but) *command*: nor are they onely held
 ‘in *fetters*, but compelled also as with a *bridle*, to perform obe-
 ‘dience to such commands.

L. 1. c. 17.
 Sect. 11. p. 66.

‘That *Thieves* and *Murderers* are the *instruments* of the
 ‘*Divine Providence*, which the Lord himself useth to execute
 ‘his *Judgements* which he hath determined within himself, and
 ‘that he works through them.

I. 1. c. 17.
 Sect. 5. p. 64.

‘That Gods *Decree*, by which any man is destined to
 ‘condemnation for sin, is not an *Act* of his *Justice*, nor doth it
 ‘presuppose sin; or if *Damnation* doth presuppose sin, it doth not
 ‘follow; that the *Præscience* of sin doth precede the *Kill* or
 ‘*Decree* of *Damning*; or if the *Will* of *Damning* any man is
 ‘an act of *vindicative Justice*, it doth not follow that it *presup-*
 ‘poses sin.

L. 1. part. 1.
 Digr. 10. c. 1.
 Sect. 4. p. 125.

‘That God can will that man shall not fall, by his will
 ‘which is called *Voluntas signi*, and in the mean while he can
 ‘ordain

Ibid. Sect. 11.
 p. 140.

'ordain that the same man shall infallibly and efficaciously fall;
 'by his *Will* which is called *Voluntas beneplaciti*. The former
 'Will of God is improperly called his *Will*, for it onely signifi-
 'eth what man ought to do by right; but the latter *Will* is
 'properly called a *Will*, because by that he decreed what should
 '[inevitably] come to passe.

In serm. de
 Proc. 5. & c.
 6. & sic citat-
 ur l. 3. part. 1.
 p. 36.

'That when God makes an *Angel* or a *Man* a *Transgressor*,
 'he himself doth not transgresse, because he doth not break a
 'Law. The very same sin, viz. *Adultery* or *Murder*, in as
 'much as it is the *Work* of God, the *Author*, mover, and com-
 'peller, it is not a crime; but in as much as it is of *man*, it is a
 'wickednesse.

L. 1. c. 18.
 Sect. 1. p. 68.

'That they are *Cowards* and seek for *subterfuges*, who say
 that this is done by God's *Permission* onely; and not by his
 'Will. If the *excacation* and *madnesse* of *Ahab* is a *Judgement*
 'of God, the *fiction* of bare *permission* doth presently *vanish*;
 'because it is ridiculous, that the Judge should onely permit, and
 'not also decree what he will have done, and also command the
 execution of it to his *Ministers*.

L. 3. part. 1. p.
 142, 143, 147
 148, & c.

'That God's decree is not lesse efficacious in the permission
 'of *Evill*, than in the production of *Good*. (Nay) that
 'God's *Will* doth passe, not onely into the *Permission* of the sin,
 'but into the *Sin* it self which is permitted. (Nay) that the
 '*Dominicans* do imperfectly and obscurely relate the Truth,
 'whilest besides Gods concurrence to the making way for sin,
 'they require nothing but the negation of efficacious grace,
 'when it's manifest, that there is a farther prostitution to sin re-
 'quired. (Nay afterwards) that God doth administer the occa-
 'sions of sinning, and doth so move and urge them, that they
 'smite the sinners minde, and really affect his *Imagination*, ac-
 'cording to all those degrees, whether of *Profit* or *Pleasure*, re-
 'presented in them.

If my hand were not weary, if my heart did not tremble, if
 both my ears did not tingle, I could reckon up many more
 such

such *frightful sayings*, from mine own *knowledge and inspection*, which I have quoted to the very page, and can do to the very line of their several Authors: besides a *cloud* of blasphemies which I could name from other *compilers*, if I either *listed* or had need to take up any upon *Trust*. Now, by all this it appears (as well as by many *too literal expositions* of some Texts in Scripture, which make God (blessed for ever!) to be the *Tempter*, the *Deceiver*, and the *Father of lies*) there is a necessity lying upon me to *prove* my *first Principle*, before some Readers will dare to *trust* it, *v. z.*

That all the Evil of sin which dwelleth in me, is not imputable to God's Will, but entirely to mine own. *The first Principle.* Adam and the Serpent may be allowed as *shavers*, but my God (blessed for ever!) is none at all.

8. This is plain by *Scripture*, and by the Evidences of Reason (to which anon I shall adde *Antiquity*.) And first for *Scripture*, though the force of a *Negative Argument* is not irrefragable, yet it is not unworthy to be observed, that God is (a) a *P. addestinare* no where affirm'd to *Predestine sin*: and therefore, the word *Deum homines Predestination* is us'd without any *Epithet*, to signifie nothing *ad peccata*, but *Election* in the ordinary sense: and it is set by (b) *Divines pœnas*, in S. (both ancient and modern) as an opposite member to *Reprobation*; which cannot be done from the bare nature of the word, but from the Use of it in *Scripture*: and why should that be the sole use of it (when the word it self is as fit to signifie the contrary) but because God is the Author of all the good we doe, and of all the good that we receive, whereas Man is his own Author of all the evil which he committeth, and of the evil which he suffereth for such commissions?

Scripturis non dicitur, sed eos ad vitam æternam prædestinare dicitur, quos vocare dæcernit. Grot. in Riv. Ap. Disc. p. 52.

b Quatuor priores Articuli Lambethani sunt d. Prædestinatione & Reprobatione; quorum illa significatur Rom. 11. 33. hæc P. al. 36. 6. Epif. Wint. de Artic. Iudic.

9. And though this bare *negative Proof* might seem sufficient in such a case [that God doth no where professe he wills or decrees the sin of Man] yet (to make us *inexcusable* when we excuse

a Exod. 20. 1.
 Rom. 6. 12.
 b 1 Tim. 1. 20
 c Deut. 11.
 18, 26.
 d Psal. 5. 4, 5.
 & 45. 7.
 Isai 61. 8.
 e Deut. 5. 29.
 f Rom. 1. 18.
 Gen. 2. 17.
 g Isai. 7. 13.
 h Psal. 81. 13.
 i Isai. 5. 3, 4.
 k Ezek. 18.
 l Vers. 2, 29.

Θελουσα
 πρῶτον, τὸ
 μὴ ἀπολείδω
 ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ
 δόλῳ μου διὰ
 τὸν ἵδ ἡμο-
 ῦν καὶ καὶ
 ἀπολείδω.
 Chrysost. in c.
 1. ad Eph. Ho-
 mil. 1. p. 136.

excuse ourselves, like *Adam*, by any the least accusation of him that made us) God doth every where professe, that he wills it not: as when he (a) forbids it by his *Laws*, when he provides against it by his (b) *Discipline*, when he (c) shews us how to avoid it, when he tels us he cannot (d) endure it, when he (e) wins us from it by *Promises*, when he frights us from it by (f) *Threats*, when he professeth that it is to him both a (g) *Trouble*, and a *Dishonour*. How doth he (h) wish that his *People* had walked in his wayes? How doth he (i) expostulate and make his *Appeal*, whether he had omitted anything, which might tend to the conversion of a sinful *Israel*? In the whole 18. (k) ch. of *Ezekiel*, God is pleased to make his own *Apologie* and *Appeal*, even to them that had accused him in an (l) unworthy *Proverb*: [the Fathers have eaten sowre Grapes, and the Childrens Teeth are set on edge] *Are not my wayes equal?* and *are not your wayes unequal?* Sure their wayes had been his, if he had absolutely contriv'd them. The soul that sinneth it shall die, vers. 4. And why will ye die, O house of *Israel*? vers. 31. Which was virtually to ask them, why they would sin too; which they ought to have done, if he had willed it: for the positive will of God must and ought to be done; and can any man be punish'd, for doing that which he must? must any man be punish'd for doing that which he ought? 'Tis but an ill κρυπτόν (which some men use) to say that God hath a double Will, of which the one is secret, and the other revealed; the revealed Will not onely diverse, but even opposite to the secret one: God ordaining sin with the one, whilst he forbids it with the other; and not alwayes willing in secret what he reveals himself to be willing to. For this is a *Salvo* (α σῶν ὁρμηανον) a great deal worse than the wound which it fain would cure. Gods will indeed is divided, amongst orthodox *Divines*, in respect of several *Acts*, and in relation to several objects; or to the very same object at several Times, and in several Qualifications, into his first will and his second will, his antecedent and his consequent, his secret and revealed will: but to affirm two wils in simplicity it self, the one contrariant to the other, about the very same act (the one decreeing that very act which is prohibited by the other) seemeth a greater blasphemy to me, than that which the *Gnosticks*, and the

the *Marcionites*, and the *Manichees* were guilty of, when they affirmed two Gods, as the different Fountains of Good and Evil. 6. Tertull. ad-
For by what I finde in *Tertullian* (who was best acquainted with *Marcion's* Heresies) those two Principles of Good and Evil were found out as a Refuge for those other opinions, against which it is that this my Scribble was first designed. And what *Tertullian* speaks against *Marcion*, might very well be repeated against the *Absolute Reprobatarians*: it having been better and more reasonable (in that Father's Judgement) that God should never have forbid what he determin'd should be done, than that he should determine to be done what he forbid. And so 'tis the lesser blasphemy of the two, to ascribe Holinesse to one principle, and Unholinesse to another (in the *Marcionites* sense) than both to him who is the Spirit of Holinesse; who therefore cannot so irrepectively decree the punishment of his Creatures, as to necessitate his sin, and so be the Author of his Impenitence.

10. Let no man say then when he is tempted, I am tempted of God (as our modern Ranters are wont to do:) for every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. So far is God from being the Author of any mans sin, that he is Faithful (saith the Apostle) and will not suffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will be sure to make a way, either for conquest, or for escape. I dare not say then (with him in the Comedian, who had been a great sinner) *Quid si hec quispiam voluit Deus?* What if some God hath so decreed it? for S. James makes me believe, that sin is both ingendred and conceived within me: when my lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin: and if my Lust is the Mother of it, sure the Father is my Will. It was *Davia's* saying of wicked *Israel*, that they provoked God to anger (not with his will, but) with their own Inventions: there are Contrivers of mischief (Psalm 58. 2.) Devils of lies (Ecclesi. 7. 13.) such as weary themselves to commit iniquity (Jer. 9. 5.) Which cannot possibly be imputed unto an absolute decree. How many Volumes have been written *De arte Magica? De arte Meretricia? De arte Lenonum?* with such others as would blush to be named in English; and dare we say they are decreed to be mysteriously wicked? or that their

August. in Her.
6. Tertull. ad-
versus Marc.
l. 1. c. 1.

Duos Deos ad-
fert tanquam
duos Symplega-
das naufragii
sui.

Quis iste Deus
tam bonus, ut
ab illo malus
fiat? ibid. c. 23.
Ibid. c. 26.

Jam. 1. 13, 14,
15.

1 Cor. 10. 13.

Teren. in Eu-
nuch.

Jam. 1. 15.

Psal. 106. 29.

Vide Cornel.
Agrip. de vanis
scient.

destruction was *irrespective*, and *unconditional*? I am in such a disorder and discomposednesse of mind, whilst I onely repeat these bold expressions, that were it not to good purpose (as I conjecture and intend) I durst not venture to repeat them. O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion of face: For thou hast made man upright, but we have found out many inventions.

Dan. 9. 7.
Eccles. 7. 29.

Proved secondly by Reason.

Hook. Eccl.
Polit. l. I.

Eph. I. II.

II. After Scripture I come to Reason: by which I hope to make it appear, that God Almighty is so far from being necessary to sin, and does so many things to hinder it, that he doth not permit it but in an equitable sense: and amongst many reasons which may be given, I shall (in civility to my Reader, and for the love of brevity) content my self with that one, which to my seeming is the best; and I the rather think it the best, because I ground it upon a notion which I have formerly learnt from most judicious Mr. Hooker. That which assignes to every thing the kind, that which moderates the power, and appoints the form and measure of working, that we properly call a Law. Hence the being of God is a kind of Law to his working; because that perfection which God is, giveth perfection to that he doth. So that being nothing but what is good, he can work nothing that is otherwise. It is therefore an error (saith that man of judgement) to think there is no Reason for the works of God, besides his absolute will, (although no reason is known to us) for the Apostle tels us, he worketh all things (not simply and meerly according to his will, but) *κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ*, according to the Counsel of his will: And because he doth voluntarily let himself a Law whereby to work, it follows that that Law is no abatement to his freedom. If he is pleas'd to set himself a Law or Rule, not to reprobate any, but upon praescience of sin (because that is most conformable to the nature of his goodnesse) can this be any prejudice to the perfection of his being? Is his nature the lesse absolute, because it pleases him that his will be conditional in some things, as it is absolute in others? Does he lose any prerogative, by being unable to be the Author of sinne? Or is not that rather a very great Argument of his Power? such an ability as that being meer Infirmity.

Infirmity. We are God's Creatures, but *sin* is ours. God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good. We see the things that are made by the *Fiat* of our will, and behold they are very evil. This Creative power of ours we justly reckon as the sequel of humane weaknesse, and shall we heedlessly affirm it to be a Jewel in the glorious diadem of God's Almightynesse? The Apostle indeed hath told us, that God worketh all things, (Ephes. i. 11.) but first he speaks it of God's Election which he predestin'd in his Son, and the means con-
 ducing to such an end, which are none but good; not at all of Reprobation, the means in order to which are none but evil. Secondly, even *Beza himself doth so interpret that place, as not to annihilate, or stupifie, but rather to strengthen and to rectifie our wills. God makes an ill will a good one, not no will at all; (as *Beza elsewhere speaks, and it were heartily to be wisht that he had never spoke otherwise) according to that of Austin, *Ex nolentibus facit volentes.* He saies *facit*; not *adigit, cogit, compellit.* He makes us willing who are unwilling, but does not force us to be willing whilest we are unwilling; (that is to say, to be willing against our wills, or whether we will or no.)

I 2. But I find that I have shot somewhat farther then I aimed; it being onely my design, and the proper business of this place, to shew, that the words of the Apostle, [*he worketh all things*] are infinitely far from being meant either of sin, or Reprobation. So far from that, that God Almighty does not permit sin, as permission signifies connivence or consent; but he permits it, as that signifies [*not to hinder by main force.*] If I see a man stealing, and say nothing to him, I so permit as to be guilty: but if I warn and exhort, if I promise and threaten, and do all that may avert him (besides killing him) I so permit as to be innocent. In like manner, all that is done by God Almighty by way of permission, is his suffering us to live, and have that nature of the will with which he made us. Whereas to destroy us for the prevention of sin, or to make us become stocks (as Beza phrases it) or like wooden Engines (which are moved only by wires at the meer pleasure & discretion of the Engineer,) were by inevitable consequence to uncreate his creature, which to do were repugnant

Gen. i. 31.

* Nec tamen
 idcirco sumus
 stupides, ea enim
 nobis ut veli-
 mus & possi-
 mus concedit.
 Bez. in Eph.

i. 11.
 * Bene volu-
 mus, or qui-
 dem natura, sed
 quia Deus ex
 mala voluntate
 bonam fecit. Ad
 Philip. 2. 13.

* Liberum &
 sui arbitrii &
 sua potestatis
 invenio homi-
 nem a Deo in-
 stitutum; nul-
 lam magis ima-
 ginem & simi-
 litudinem Dei
 in illo animad-
 veriens, quam
 ejusmodi status
 formam. Ter-
 tull. advers.
 Marc. lib. 2. c.
 5. see also cap.
 6, 7.

pugnant to his immutability, as *Tertul.* shews. This is all that I am able to apprehend, or pronounce [that God permits our sins in this sense only; and that he disposes and orders them to the best advantage.]

Proved by An-
tiquity c. 2.
Sect. 18.

12. Having proved my first Principle by Scripture and Reason, it will be as easie to confirm it by the common suffrage of Antiquity; and to avoid the repetition of so long a Catalogue, which I suppose will be as needlesse, as I am sure it will be nauseous to a considerable Reader, I REFER him to the CITATIONS which will FOLLOW my FIRST INFERENCE, SECT. 18. I will content my self at present to shut up all with (a) that Article of the *Augustan Confession* (to which our 39. Articles have the greatest regard and conformity, and which for that very reason is to me the most venerable of any Protestant Confession except our own) That though God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature, yet the only cause of sin is the will of the wicked (that is to say, of the Devil and ungodly men) turning it self from God to other things, against the (will and) commandments of God. (b) And the *Orange Synod* doth pronounce an *Anathema* upon all that think otherwise. *ad alias res, contra mandata Dei. August. Confess. Artic. 6.*

b Aliquot ad malum divina potestate præordinatos esse, non solum non credimus, sed etiam si sint qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione in illis *Anathema* dicimus. *Synod. Aurasic. Can. 25.*

If any will not subscribe to this *Confession*, I will leave him to learn modesty both from *Arrian the Heathen*, and from *Philo the Jew*.

Ἐκστασιάζει γὰρ ἄλλοι μὴ ἵδμεν, ὡς οὐκ αὐτῷ *N. Arrian. in Epictet.*
Εἴμαρ μὴ ὡς τε καὶ ἀνέγκειν διαπλασθέντες ἀσέβειαν πολλῆς κατὰ
πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον. *Philo περὶ ἀπειρίας τοῦ Ἀβραάμ. p. 325.*

CHAP. II.

I 4.

MY first Demand being fully granted (as in the *Mathematicks* 'tis usual to build upon certain *Postulata*) it doth immediately follow, that

[Man himself is the sole efficient cause of his eternal punishment.]

The first Infe-
rence.

Ο πετῆς ἀν-
 τῆς, ἔχ' ὅπ' αὐτῆς
 ἡ ἀντὶς ὁ
 Διδόσας αἰ-
 τῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς
 πονηρῆς γάρ-
 νύαι, ὅτις ὁκ
 τέρπων γίνεῃ.
 Ammonius in
 Job. 8.

Our selves we
condemn as the
only causes of
our own misery
Hook. lib. 5.

Scd. 72.
Proved by
Scripture in the
negative.

C. 18. v. 32.

2 Pet. 3. 9.

(I say the *sole Cause*, as excluding *God*, but not the *Devil*; whom yet I also exclude from the *efficiency of the Cause*; because he can onely *incite*, and *propose objects*, and adde *perswasions* to sin, but cannot *force* or *cause* it in me without my *will* and *consent*: so that the Devil being onely a *Tempter* and *Perswader*, cannot for that be justly stiled an *efficient*. Or if he were, sure for that very Reason *God* himself cannot be so: but onely *Man* and the *Devil* must be the *Concauses* of mans *destruction*.) Which is the second thing I am to prove both by *Scripture*, and *Reason*, and the whole *suffrage* of *Antiquity*.

15. And here I shall not be so solicitous as to rife my Concordance, but make use of such Scriptures as lye uppermost in my memory, and so are readiest to meet my pen. These I find are of two sorts, *negative* on Gods part, and *affirmative* on *mans*. God gives the first under his *oath*, (Ezek. 33. 11.) “As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your wicked waies, for why will you die, O house of Israel? In the 18. *ch.* of the same *Prophecie*, the *Latine* translation is more *emphatical* than the *English*: for there it is not [*non cupio*] but [*nolo mortem morientis;*] not that he doth *not will* the death of a sinner, but *that he wils it not*: he doth not only *not desire it*, but (which makes the proof more forcible) *he desires the contrary*, even *that he should turn from his wickednesse and live*, (chapter 33. vers. 14.) *not willing* (saith S. Peter) *that any should perish*, but (on the contrary) *that all should come to Repentance*. And so (1 Tim. 2. 4.) *He will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth*. Where it appears by the Context, that the Apostle does not onely speak of *all kinds* of

D

par-

The sinner Charged by Scripture. Chap. 2.

particulars, but of *all particulars* of the *kindes* too: For he first of all exhorts them, that *prayers, and supplications, and giving of thanks be made for all men,* (verse 1.) secondly, he does instance in one sort of men, *for Kings and all that are in Authority,* (verse 2.) thirdly, he adds the Cause of his exhortation, *for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved,* (verse 3, 4.) And if the Spanish Friar said true, that *few Kings go to Hell,* (giving this reason) *because all Kings are but few,* the Apostles way of arguing will be so much the stronger; for when he speaks of *all men* in general, he makes his instance in *Kings*, in *all Kings* without exception, thereby intimating *Nero* the worst of *Kings*, under whom at that time the *Apostle* lived. And he uses another argument (verse 6.) because *Christ gave himself a Ransom for all.* This is yet more plain from *Rom. 2. 4, 5.* "Despise thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thy self wrath against the day of wrath? Observe who they are whom God would have to repent; even the *hard-hearted* and the *impenitent.* But I have stronger proofs out of Scripture, and lesse liable to *cavil* than any of these, which yet I thought fit to use, because I find they are the *chief* of those that *Vossius* relies upon, and expounds to my purpose from the *Authority* of the *Ancients.* I will add to these but three or four Texts more, of which the one will so *establissh* and *explain* the other, as to leave no place of evasion to the gainsayer. First, our blessed Saviour is called by the Apostle, *the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe,* (1 Tim. 4. 10.) As if the Apostle had foreseen an objection, that the word [*all*] might be restrained unto the *household of Faith*, he prevents it by a distinction of *general* and *special*: For if he is a *special Saviour of believers*, he is a *general Saviour* of those that are *unbelievers*: not that *unbelievers* can be saved, whilest they are *obstinate unbelievers*, but upon condition they will *repent and believe*; else why should the Apostle affirm the *Saviour* to be of *all*, and then come off with an [*especially*] to them that *believe*? Certainly if it is every

*Veteris hac
Ecclesie senten-
tia fuit, velle
Deum conver-
sionem ad sa-
lutem omnium,
non tantum ge-
nera singulo-
rum, sed singulos
generum intel-
ligens. Gerard.
Voss. in Pelag.
Hist. l. 7.
Thes. 2.*

every mans duty to believe in Christ, Christ dyed for every man. And this very argument is not easily answered in the very confession of Dr. Twisse; who yet by and by saies, 'tis easily answered, and yet he leaves it without an answer; he only scornes it, and lets it passe. *Twiss. in Respon. ad Armin. Praefat. p. 16. col. 2.* This is secondly confirm'd from the Apostle's way of arguing (2 Cor. 5. 14.) *If one died for all, then were all dead.* This is the major Proposition of an hypothetical syllogisme: in which the thing to be proved is, *that all were dead*; and the Medium to prove it is, *that one dyed for all.* Now every man knows (that understands how to reason) that the argument of proof must be rather more, than lesse, known, than the thing in question to be proved: so that if it be clear, that *all men were dead* by the fall of the first Adam, it must be clearer (as St. Paul argues) that *life was offered unto all* by the death of the second Adam; and if none were dyed for but the Elect, then the Elect only were dead: for the word *[all]* must signifie as amply in the Assumption, as it does in the Sequel; or else the Reasoning will be fallacious and imperfect. The Apostle thus argues:

If one dyed for all, then were all dead;

But one dyed for all; (that must be the Assumption)

Therefore all were dead.

Whosoever here denies the Minor, does (before he is aware) condemn the Sequel of the Major, and so gives the Lie to the very words of the Text; which I can look for from none but some impure Helvidius, who would conclude the greatest falsehoods from the word of Truth. This is thirdly confirmed from the saying of the Apostle, (Rom. 11. 32.) *that God concluded all in unbelief,* (the Gentiles first, verse 30. and afterwards the Jewes, verse 31.) *that he might have mercy upon all.* From whence I inferre, that if this last *[all]* belong to none but the Elect, then none but the Elect were concluded in unbelief. But it is plain that all without exception were (first or last) concluded in unbelief: therefore the mercy was meant to all without exception. Lastly it is confirm'd from those false Prophets and false Teachers, (2 Pet. 2. 1.) who though privily bringing in damnable heresies, even denying the

the Lord that bought them, and bringing upon themselves swift destruction, yet it seems they were such whom the Lord had bought. So far is God from being the Cause of mans destruction, by an absolute, irrelative, unconditional Decree, that he gave himself a ransom even for them that perish. They were not left out of the bargain which was made with his Justice, but the Apostle tells us they were actually bought. He whose blood was sufficient for a thousand worlds, would not grudge its extent to the major part of but one. He was merciful to all men, but the greatest part of men are unmerciful to themselves. He is the Saviour of all, but yet all are not saved: because he only offers, does not obtrude himself upon us. He * offers himself to all, but most refuse to receive him. He will have no man to perish, but repent, by his Antecedent will; but by his Consequent will he will have every man perish that is impenitent. Which is sufficient to have been said for the negative part of my undertaking, [That the cause of Damnation is not on God's part:] in which, if any one Text be found of power to convince, let no man cavil at those others which seem lesse convincing. If any one hath an objection, let him stay for an answer till his objection is urged. It might seem too easie, to solve objections of my own choice, or confute an argument of my own making; and therefore I passe (without notice of common shifts and subterfuges, till I am call'd to that Drudgery) to the second part of my enterprize, which is the affirmative.

* Gratiam salutarem non ultimo conferri omnibus, sed tamen omnibus offerri; & passio esse Deum ut conferatur. Episc. Winc. de Artic. Lamb. Omnibus offerri Dei misericordia. Nemo illius expers est, nisi qui pervenit. Bernard. serm. 1. In Purif. Mar.

In the affirmative.

16. [That man himself is the cause of his eternal punishment.] Which though supposed in the negative, must yet be proved to some persons, who are prevailed upon by fashions and modes of speech; and will deny that very thing when they see it in one colour, which they will presently assent to when they behold it in another. He who is very loth to say, that God is the Author of sin and damnation, will many times say it in other termes; and therefore in other terms it must be proved that he is not. O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help, (Hosea 13. 6.) They that privily bring in Damnable Heresies shall bring upon themselves swift destruction. The foolishness of man perverteth his way. And as when lust conceiveth

Hos. 13. 6.
2 Pet. 2. 1.
Prov. 19. 3.

it

it bringeth forth sin, so when sin is finished it bringeth forth death, (Iam. 1.15.) If death is that monster, of which sin is the Dam that brings it forth, how foul a thing must be the Sire? and can there be any greater blasphemy, than to bring God's Providence into the pedigree of Death? Death (saith the Apostle) is the wages of sin, Rom. 6.23. and wages is not an absolute, but a relative word. It is but reason he should be paid it, who hath dearly earn'd it by his work. It is the will of man that is the servant of sin; Disobedience is the work, Ver. 20.

Death eternal is the wages, and the Devil is the pay-master; who as he sets men to work to the dishonour of their Creator, so he paises them their wages to the advancement of his glory. From whence I conclude (with the Book of Wisdome) "God made not death, neither hath he pleasure in the destruction of the living: for he created all things that they might have their being, and the generations of the world were healthful, and there is no poyson of Destruction in them, nor the kingdome of death upon the earth. But ungodly men with their words and works call'd it to them, and made a covenant with it; because they are worthy to take [wisdom] part with it. Wild. 1, 13, 14, 15, 16.

17. I will confirm this truth by no more than one Reason; which, if it is not the best, doth seem to me to be the fittest; as being aptest to evince both the connexion and necessity of my first inference from my first Principle. It is taken from the nature and use of punishment; which as soon as it is named, doth presuppose a Guilt: for as every sin is the transgression of some Law, so every punishment is the revenge of some sin: upon which it follows, that if a mans sin is from himself, 'tis from himself that he is punisht. And as the Law is not the Cause, but the Occasion only of sin; so God is not the Cause, but the inflietor only of punishment: for so saies the Apostle, "Sin taking occasion by the Commandment wrought in me all manner of Concupiscence: for without the Law sin was dead. That which is good not being made death, but sin working death by that which is good. God and his Law are, each of them, the *Causa sine qua non*, the Condition without which sin and punishment could not have been, (for without Law no sin, & without God no Reprobation;) but not the Energetical efficient Cause, of which sin & punishment. Proved secondly by Reason. * Aroqua. * Rom. 7. 8. vers. 13.

nishment were the necessary effects. For if God had made a Hell by an absolute purpose, meerly because he would that some should suffer it, and not in a previous intuition of their sins; Damnation had been a Misery, but not a Punishment: as if a Potter makes a vessel on purpose that he may break it, (which yet none but a mad man can be thought to do) or if a man meerly for recreation cuts up Animals alive, (which yet none ever did that I can hear of, except a young Spanish Prince) it is an Infelicity and a torment, but no more a punishment than it is any thing else. Indeed the Common people, who do not understand the just propriety of words, make no distinction many times betwixt Pain and Punishment: not considering that Punishment is a relative word, of which the correlative is breach of Law; and therefore is fitly expressed in Scripture by the mutual relation betwixt a Parent and a Child: when Lu¹ hath * conceived it bringeth forth sin; sin being perfected bringeth forth death, (Iam. 1. 15.) which is as much as to say (according to the propriety of the Apostles words) sin is the parent, and death is the childe. Now there cannot be a child without a parent; (for they are relata secundum esse) much lesse can the child be before the parent; (for sunt simul natura, & dicuntur ad convertentiam.) Upon which it followes, that punishment could not be ordained by God, either without sin or before it, or without respect and intuition of it, (which yet the great * Mr. Calvin does plainly say;) I say, it could not, because it implies a contradiction. For though God could easily make Adam out of the earth, and the earth out of nothing, yet he could not make a sinful Cain to be the son of sinful Adam, before there was an Adam, much lesse before there was a sinful one: because it were to be and not to be at the same time; Adam would be a Cause, before an entity; which God Almighty cannot do, because he is Almighty. So that when the Romanists assert their Transubstantiation, or the posterity of Marcion their Absolute decree of all the evil in the world, (both pretending a Reverence to Gods omnipotence) they doe as good as say, † those things which are true may therefore be false, because they are true; or that God is so * Almighty, as to be able not to be God: that being the Result of an Ability to make

* Συλλαβῶν
τίκτει.

† Αποκνῆ.

Τὴν ἀντὶ ἀπο-
κνῆσαι, apud
Lucianum dr.

* Ideo praesci-
verit, quia de-
creto s. o. s. or-
dinavit. And
for no other
reason, Nisi
quia Deo ita
visum est. Cal-
vin. Instit. l. 3.
cap. 23. Sect. 7.
p. 325.

† Non percipit se
dicere, ea qua
vera sunt, eo
ipso quod vera
sunt, falsa sunt.
August. contra
Faustum.

* Οὐ δύναται
ἀγαθὸς εἶ Θεός,
ἐπεὶ ἔστι καὶ
Θεὸς δύνα-
μις καὶ ἔστι
ὁ Θεός. Ori-
gen. contra
Celsum, l. 4.

two parts of a contradiction true: (so said S. Austin against Faustus, and Origen against Celsus.) Whensoever it is said, [God can do all things] 'tis meant of all things that become him. So Isidore the Pelusiote. But (to return to that argument in the pursuit of which I have stept somewhat too forward) if Gods præordination of mans eternal misery were in order of nature before his presence of mans sin, as Mr. Calvin evidently affirms in his [Ideo præsciverit, quia decreto suo præordinavit,] setting Praordination as the Cause, or Reason, or previous Requisite to his Præscience) either mans Reprobation must come to passe without sin, or else he must sin to bring it orderly to passe; which is to make God the author either of misery by it self without relation to sin, or else of sin in order to misery. The first cannot be, because God hath * sworn, he hath no pleasure in the death of a sinner, (Ezek. 33. 14.) much lesse in his death that never sinn'd. And because, if it were so, the Scripture would not use the word Wages, and the word Punishment, and the word Retribution, and the word Reward. Hell indeed had been a torment, but not a Recompence; a fatal Misery, but not a Mulet; an act of power, but not of vengeance; which yet in many places is the stile that God speaks in, Vengeance is mine, and I will repay, Rom. 12: 19. Nor can the second be lesse impossible, it having formerly been proved, that God is not the Author of sin; * he hath no need of the sinful man, whereby to bring mans Ruine the more conveniently about; and most of them that dare say it, are fain to say it in a Disguise. Some indeed are for [lignonem, lignonem;] but the more modest blasphemers are glad to dresse it in cleaner phrase. A strange *πρωδύσεος* in Divinity, to put the (1) child before the parent, the (2) wages before the work, the (3) end before the means, the Reprobation before the sin! yet so they do who make the Decree of Reprobation most irrelative and unconditional; and after that say, that whom God determines to the end, he determines to the meanes. To put the horse upon the Bridle, is a more rational Hypallage: For by this Divinity eternal punishment is imputed to Gods Antecedent will, (which is called the first) and sin to his consequent will, (which is the second.) The first *πρωδύσεος*, and the other only *εποδύσεος*, punishment chiefly, and sin by way of consecution. Men are bid

Isidorus Pelu-
siota quærenti,
si Θεὸς πάντα
δυνατὲς, re-
spondit, πάντα
τὰ πρὸ ποτα
αὐτοῦ.
* Loco superius
paulo citato.

* Idcirco jurat,
ut si non credi-
mus promit-
tenti Deo, cre-
damus saltem
pro salute ju-
rantii. Hieron.
Epi. 46.

O beatos nos,
quorum causa
Deus jurat! O
miserrimos, si
nec juranti cre-
dimus! Tertul.
l. de pœnit.
cap. 4.

* Eccles. 15, 12.

1 Jam. 1. 15.
2 Rom. 6. 23.
3 Rom. 6. 21.

Poterit Deus
velle voluntate
figui & appro-
bante, ut homo
non labatur;
interea volun-
tate beneplaciti
statuere potest
gratiam effica-
cem negare, ex
quo infallibili-
ter & efficaciter
sequetur ut la-
batur. Twiss, in
viii. Grat. l. 1
de präd. S. &
12. p. 140.
† Jos. Pela. hist.
l. 6. Thes. 2.
* Quod dicere
periculosum, ad
edificationem
proferendum
est. Tertul. de
pœn. cap. 5.
* Decretum
horribile qui-
dem factor, in-
ficiari tamen
nemo poterit.
Calv. I. Rit. l. 3:
c. 23. Sect. 7.
Lib. I. part. I.
Sect. 13. p. 140.

bid not to sin *ex voluntate signi*, or *revelata*; but are deter-
min'd to it *ex voluntate occulta*, or *beneplaciti*. Distincti-
ons very good, when at first they were invented for better
uses: the former by S. Chrysostome, from whom it was
borrow'd by Damascene, and from him by the Schoolmen.
But I say they all were used to very contrary purposes, by
them, and by these, who endeavour'd to repel those
Fathers with their own weapons, (as the elaborate † Ge-
rard Vossius does very largely make it appear.) I am sorry I
must say, (what yet I must (saith * Tertullian) when it may
tend to edification) That the Lord God merciful, and graci-
ous, long-suffering, abundant in goodnesse and truth, who is
all Bowels, and no gall, who hateth nothing that he hath
made, who in the midst of Iudgement remembreth mercy,
ever forgiving iniquity, transgression and sin, is exhibited to
the world by the Authors and Abettors of unconditional Re-
probation, as a kind of Platonick Lover of so excellent a
Creature's everlasting misery: Which if Mr. Calvin himself
confessed to be a * Horrible Decree (who yet believ'd it)
how frightful must that opinion appear to me, who did
therefore leave it, because it frighted me into my wits?
For to say that God is *ἀνθρῳποκτόνος*, a slayer of men from
all eternity, (who is the Lamb slain, that is, a Saviour from
the foundation of the world, Rev. 13. 8.) is to affirm that of
him, which he affirmed of the Devil, who is called by our
Saviour, A Murderer from the beginning, Ioh. 8. 44.
Which the Devil could not be, if God had absolutely wil-
led the Death of any, without respect or relation to the
snares of the Devil: it being impossible to murder the Dead,
or to slay those that were killed long before they were born.
I know by whom it is answered, [That God doth will
sin, not as it is sin, but as it is a Medium for the setting
forth of his Glory; and so Damnation.] But whilett
men finde out Distinctions to excuse God Almighty, they
doe imply him to have offended. Which I am so weary
even to think on, that I hasten, for some refreshment, to
my third proof of this Inference, from the suffrage of An-
tiquity.

Proved thirdly
by Antiquity.

18. Before I name any particular, I will take the confidence
to say in general, That all the Greek and Latine Fathers be-
fore

Theophil. ad
Autol. l. 3. p.
336. edit. Basil.
1555.

Origen. tract.
34. in Matth.
p. 194.

Athanas. Orat.
de incarn. vero
D. i. T. i. p. 45.
Macr. in Ho-
mil. 26. p. 230.
Homil. 30. p. 53
Basil. H. mil. in
Psal. 29. p. 80.

Ambros. l. 2. de
secunda Inter-
pellat. David.
c. 11.

Hilarius Dia-
con. in epist.
Pauli in Rom.
c. 3. & 9. Idem
ad 1 Tim. ii.

Chrysost. in
1 Tim. c. 2. p.
1556.
Idem ad Eph.
c. 1. Hom. 1. p.
2036.

Ἀντὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ βυλομένης ἐπιστρέφον τὸ γένος ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ πα-
σῶν ἡμῶν ἀμαρτιῶν.

"Ignem autem æternum non illis, quibus dicitur [discedite
a me maledicti,] paratum ostendit, sicut regnum justis,
sed Diabolo, & Angelis ejus: quia quantum ad se, homi-
nes non ad perditionem creavit, sed ad vitam æternam
& gaudium. (Note that Chrysostome, Theophylact,
and Enthymius, interpret these words of Christ, as Origen
doth.)

Τί δ' ἔτι ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίησεν τέτις, ἀφ' ὧν ἐκ ἠθέλησε μὴ σώσειν;
Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἵνα δείξῃ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπλάγχνα, πάντας δέχεσθαι, πᾶ-
σαν προαίρεσιν. Et alibi, αὐτὸς πολὺν ἀπλαγχνίζετο ἵνα ἡμᾶς, μα-
κροθυμῶν, πότε ἐπιστρέψαντες προσέλθωμεν πρὸς αὐτόν.
Τιμωρία, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κέσμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ζῶν δὲ, ἐν τῷ δειλήματι
αὐτοῦ. Τί ἔν φησιν; ὅτι ὁ μὲν θέλει ὁ Θεὸς τὸ τὸ δεῖν, πάντας μετέ-
χειν αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν.

"Ideo venit Dominus Jesus, ut salvum faceret quod perie-
rat. Venit ergo ut peccatum mundi tolleretur, ut vulnera no-
stra curaret. Sed quia non omnes medicinam expetunt, sed
plerique refugiunt, ideo volentes curat, non adstringit
invitos.

"Non injuste judicat, quia omnes vult salvos fieri, manente
justitia. Deus utique vult omnes salvos fieri. Cur non
impletur ejus voluntas? Sed in omni locutione sensus est,
conditio latet. Vult omnes salvos fieri, sed si accedant ad
eum: Non enim sic vult, ut nolentes salventur, sed vult illos
salvari, si & ipsi velint; nam legem omnibus dedit, nullum
excepit a salute.

Μιμῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰ πάντας θέλει σωθῆναι, εἰκότως ἔστω ἀπάντων δεῖ
εὐχεσθαι. Εἰ πάντας αὐτὸς ἠθέλησε σωθῆναι, θέλει καὶ σύ. Εἰ δὲ θέ-
λει, εὐχεσθαι. Πάντα γὰρ μὴν εὐδοκία τὸ θέλημα δεῖ τὸ προηγούμενον.
Ὅτι γὰρ καὶ ἄλλο θέλημα. Διὸν θέλημα πρῶτον τὸ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι ἡμαρ-
τηκότας, θέλημα δευτέρου, τὸ ἡγομένους κακὰς ἀπολέσθαι. Ὁ γὰρ δὲ
ἀνάγκη αὐτὸς κολάζει, ἀλλὰ θέλημα. εὐδοκία ἐν τῷ πρῶτον θέ-
λημα. Τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα τὸ μὴ ἐπιθυμίας θέλημα. τίνα ἔστιν ἐνε-
χον ἔγω φιλεῖ ἀπὸ μόνης ἀγαθότητος. ἢ γὰρ χάρις ἀγαθότης
ἐστίν.

"Mir

"Miseratur humano generi Deus, & non vult perire quod fecit.

Hieronymus
advers. Felagianos l. 2. sub
finem, & ad
Eph. c. 1.

"Vult Deus quæcunque sunt plena rationis & consilii. Vult salvari omnes & in agnitionem veritatis venire. Sed quia nullus absque propria voluntate servatur, (liberi enim arbitrii sumus) vult nos bonum velle, ut cum voluerimus, velit in nobis & in se suum implere consilium.

"Constat Deum omnia bona velle, sed homines suo vitio præcipitantur in malum.

Primasius in
1 Tim. 2.

Χρὴ ὃ εἰδέναι, ὡς ὁ Θεὸς προηγουμένως θέλει πάντας σωθῆναι, καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ τυχεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ μεταστῆναι τὴν ἀγαθότητα αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀγαθός. Ἀμαρτάνοντας ὃ θέλει καλεῖσθαι, ὡς δίκαιος. Λέγει ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον προηγουμένως θέλει ἡμᾶς, καὶ ἰουδαίαν, ἔξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ δεύτερον ἐπομένως θέλει ἡμᾶς, καὶ παρρηγοῦντες ἐξ ἡμετέρων αἰτίας. -- ἀγαθὸν ὃ ἡ δικαιοσύνη εἰ γὰρ θέλων κείναι, ἀλλ' ἔτι προηγουμένως θέλει ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπόμενον. -- καὶ τὸ μὲν προηγουμένως θέλει ἡμᾶς τὸ Θεὸς τὴν ἀγαθότητα ὅτι, τὸ ὃ ἐπόμενον τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ.

Damasceus l.
2. orth. fid. c. 29.

"Εἰ θέλει ὁ Θεὸς [πάντας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν] τί μὴ γίνῃ ὃ θέλει; ἢ γίνῃ, ὅτι οὐκ οἶνοι ἢ θέλουσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην ποιεῖ ὁ Θεός.

Idem contra
Manichæos p.
375. ed. t. Ba-
sil. 1578.
Oecumenius ad
1 Tim. 2.

"Duæ sunt voluntates in Deo. Una *misericordia*, quæ non est cogens, nec aliquid libero arbitrio aufert, qua omnes homines vult salvos fieri, quod tamen in libera voluntate illorum positum est. Est alia, quæ est de effectibus rerum, de qua dicitur, [omnia quæcunque voluit, fecit:] huic nemo potest resistere; de qua dicitur, Voluntati ejus quis resistit? (atque hæc est duplex: *permittens*, respectu mali; *approbans*, respectu boni.) Itaque homines resistunt voluntati *misericordiae*, & non resistunt voluntati *justitiæ*. (Postea in hunc sensum.) "Orate ergo; *Fiat voluntas tua* sicut in cælo (ubi non resistitur) sic & in terris, (ubi resistitur.)

Anselmus in
Math. c. 6.

"Deus ex se sumit seminarium miserendi. Quod judicat & condemnat nos, *eum quodammodo cogimus*, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius misericordia, quam animadversio procedere videatur. -- Omnibus offertur, & in communi posita est Dei misericordia; nemo illius expers est, nisi qui renuit.

Bernardus
serm. 5. in Nat.
tal. Dom.
Idem serm. 1.
in purif. Mar.

If after all these testimonies, I have S. Austin & Prosper to
side with me in my assertion, I know not why I may not see
E 2 to

Grotius in Ri-
vet. Apolog.
Discus. p. 97,
98.

to those who think me in an error, at least to have *rationally* and *discreetly* erred: and though Grotius gives a reason why S. Austin is the unfittest to be a Judge in these matters, yet if Prosper (who best knew him) may be allowed for his *Inter-preter*, I am very well content that he be one of my Jury; for of *four Expositions* which that Father made (in several parts of his writings) upon 1 Tim. 2. 4. [*God will have all men to be saved,*] I find one very directly just such as I would have it; and it is even in those writings which he penn'd after the Heresie of Pelagius was on foot; which is therefore with me of very great moment and authority.

To this Question,

August. in lib.
de spiritu &
litera ad Mar-
cellinum c. 33.

"De bona voluntate unde sit, si natura, cur non omnibus, cum sit idem Deus omnium Creator? si dono Dei, etiam hoc quare non omnibus, cum omnes homines velit salvos fieri?

He thus answers;

"Vult Deus omnes homines salvos fieri, non sic tamen ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur. Quod cum sit, Infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum ejus Evangelio non credunt: nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verum seipsos fraudant magno & summo bono, malisque pœnalibus implicant, expeturi in suppliciis potestatem ejus, cujus in donis misericordiam contempserunt.

Idem. serm. 38.
de Sanctis.

"Inevitabilis illa sententia [*discedite à me maledicti*] à piissimo Deo ideo multe ante prædicitur, ut à nobis totis viribus caveatur: si enim nos Deus noster vellet punire, non nos ante tot secula commoneret. Invitus quodammodo vindicat, qui quomodo evadere possimus, multo ante demonstrat: non enim te vult percutere, qui tibi clamat, *observa*.

* Nihil aliud accipiendum in isto Augustini sermone existimo, quo ad interitum quosdam prædestinatos firmat, &c. Fulgent. ad Monim. l. 1.

*Tis very true that S. Austin did sometimes let fall such expressions (transported sometimes in the heat of his dispute) as rais'd some calumnies after his death, as if he had thought that God created the greatest part of mankind on purpose to do the will, not of God, but of the Devil. But Prosper made it appear, in his Answers to that and the like Objections, that they who censur'd Austin's Judgement, were seduced to it by his style: and that (notwithstanding the misfortune of his expressions) Austin's judgement and his own was clearly this, (and so Fulgentius doth profess to understand it).

-- "Sin-

" -- Sincerissime credendum atque profitendum est, Deum velle
 " ut omnes homines salvi fiant. Siquidem Apostolus, cujus ista
 " sententia est, sollicitissime præcipit, ut Deo pro omnibus ho-
 " minibus supplicetur : ex quibus quod multi pereunt, sal-
 " vantur est meritum ; quod multi salvantur, sal-
 " vantur est donum. -- Nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret :
 " quia alia est causa Nascendi, alia Pereundi. Ut enim na-
 " scantur homines, conditoris est beneficium ; ut autem pereant,
 " prævaricatoris est meritum. -- Insanum omnino est dicere,
 " Voluntatem Dei ex Dei voluntate non fieri ; & Damnatorem
 " Diaboli ejusque famulorum, velle ut Diabolo serviatur. ---
 " Nullo modo credendū homines --- ex Dei voluntate cecidisse,
 " cum potius allevet Dominus omnes qui corruunt, & erigat om-
 " nes elisos. -- Dei ergo voluntas est, ut in bona voluntate ma-
 " neatur. Qui & priusquam deseratur, neminem deserit : &
 " multos desertores saepe convertit. -- Deus nec quæ illumina-
 " vit, obcæcat ; nec quæ ædificavit, destruit ; nec quæ planta-
 " vit, evellit. Quia præsciti sunt casuri, non sunt prædestinati.
 " Essent autem prædestinati, si essent reversuri, & in sancti-
 " tate ac veritate mansuri : ac per hoc prædestinatio Dei mul-
 " tis est causa standi, nemini est causa labendi. -- Hi cum à
 " pietate deficiunt, non ex Dei opere, sed ex sua voluntate de-
 " ficiunt, casuri tamen & recessuri ab eo, qui falli non potest,
 " præsciuntur. -- Deniq; qui voluntatem spreverant inviz-
 " tantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

" Ο Διδβλος ἔπρωτον ἀπατήσας ἔανδρωπον, διητδν τδ γίνος
 " διὰ τδ οὐκ ἔνυ παρηλάσας ἀπειράσατο. Theodor. Heracl. in
 " Joh. 8. 44.

" Anathema illi qui per Dei præscientiam in mortem ho-
 " minem deprimi dixerit. Synod. Arelatensis.

" Suo prorsus decipiuntur Arbitrio, sua voluntate labuntur ; &
 " si in hac defidia perseverent, ipsi se his quæ accipere despoli-
 " ant. Scriptor. de vocat. Gent. l. 2, cap. 11.

" Quos præscivit Deus homines vitam in peccato terminatu-
 " ros, prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos. Ful-
 " gentius ad Monimum l. 1.

" Lastly, that this is precisely the judgement of the Church of
 " England, I cannot better prove than by that sense & apprehen-
 " sion which Bishop Overal had of it ; who does professedly in-
 " terpret the mind of her Articles in this particular, and

* Causam Re-
 probationis cer-
 tum est hanc
 esse, viz. pecca-
 tum in homini-
 bus. Melanchr.
 in locis Theo-
 log. de prædest.
 p. 316, 317.
 Idem ubiq; ait
 Petrus Moli-
 nez in sua A-
 natome Aimi-
 nianismi.

D. Overallus
Theol. Cantab.
professor de
sententia Ec-
clesiæ Anglic.
&c. cap. 1.

was as well able to do it as any man that ever lived.

“ -- Sub generali promissione & præcepto tuto quisque potest
“ indubia fide se includere, & cum certa spe ac fiducia ad
“ thronum gratiæ accedere, vereque cognoscere, si non *confidat*
“ Deo promittenti, & mandanti obsequatur, suam culpam esse,
“ non Dei; idque per negligentiam suam, non gratia divine
“ defectum, accidere. -- Ordo divinæ prædestinationis nostræ
“ in Articulo septimo iste videtur intentus; Deum præscium
“ lapsus generis humani ad remedium ejusdem filium mitten-
“ dum decrevisse, in eoque salutis conditionem statuisse: tum
“ ad eam in animis hominum producendam necessaria & suf-
“ ficientia media & auxilia omnibus generatim secundum ma-
“ gis & minus ordinasse, quæ magis speciatim his quos in
“ Christo elegit ex reliquo hominum genere pro suo benepla-
“ cito cumularet, quibus hi ad fidem, perseverantiam & æter-
“ nam salutem certissime perducantur, & reliqui nihil habeant
“ quod conquerantur, &c.

Cap. 2. de
morte Christi.

“ De morte Christi tam plena & ubique sibi constans Ec-
“ clesiæ nostræ sententia, pro omnibus omnino hominibus, sive
“ pro omnibus omnium hominum peccatis, Jesum Christum
“ mortuum esse, ut mirandum sit ullos ex nostris id in contro-
“ versiam vocare.

Artic. 2.

Artic. 7. 3

Artic. 31.

“ Pro omnibus actualibus hominum peccatis, non tantum
“ pro culpa Originis.

“ Aeterna vita humano generi est proposita.

“ Oblatio Christi semel facta perfecta est Redemptio, pro-
“ pitatio & satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi, tam
“ originalibus quam actualibus.

Calvin. ad
Heb. 9. 28.

It is farther observed by that most moderate and learned
man, that Mr. Calvin himself, however rigid he were in some
places, yet did so soberly contradict himself in others, that
those very texts of Scripture, in which it is affirmed [Christ dy-
ed for many] he so interprets as to say, the word [many] is put
to signifie [all] as Heb. 9. 28. and that many are not saved is
(saith he) for this reason, [quia eos impedit sua incredulitas]
“ because they are hindred by their own incredulity.

Idem ad Rom.
5.

The total sum
of the Citati-
ons.

19. I have not translated these Authorities, because they are
principally meant for such as are able to understand them.
And if any plain Reader shall desire to have them in the
Grasse, without being troubled to suffer them over in the retail,
he

he may be pleas'd to receive it in these following words:
 'That God did not absolutely, irrespectively, unconditionally
 'decree the everlasting misery of any one, but in a foresight
 'and intuition of their refusing his profer. That he sent his Son
 'to die for all the sins of the whole world, inviting and com-
 'manding all men every where to repent [*and be forgiven*]
 '(*Acts 17. 30.*) but that most, like the *slave* in *Exodus*, are
 'in love with their bondage, and will be bored through the
 'ear. That everlasting fire was prepared especially (not for
 'men, but) for the Devil and his Angels; nor for them by a
 'peremptory irrespectiv^e Decree, but in præscience and respect
 'of their pride and Apostasy. That Christ came to save that
 'which was lost, and to call sinner to repentance, and to have
 'gather'd them as a Hen gathereth her Chickens under her
 'wings, but they would not. That God gave his law, his rule,
 'his promises to all, and excepted none in the publishing of
 'either; but so as he expected they should be willing as well
 'as he: for he would not save any whether they would or no.
 'That God Almighty made no man on purpose to torment
 'him, but that he might participate of his goodnesse. * "That
 '"so many as perish may thank themselves; and that so many as
 '"live for ever are beholding to nothing but the grace of God.
 '"That God decreed the fall of none, but the raising up of those
 '"were down: and that those very men who are reprobated, had
 '"been predestin'd to salvation, if they would have return'd
 '"and remain'd in truth and holinesse; Gods Decrees being to
 '"many the cause of their rise, but to none of their downfal.
 '"Lastly, that they who have despis'd the will of God, wch did
 '"invite them to repentance, shall feel the terrors of his will, wch
 '"is to execute vengeance upon the children of Disobedience.

* The English Reader may be pleas'd to observe, that these last words are translated out of Prosper in his vindication of Augustine his dearest Friend, who is the only Father (I can hear of) whom our adversaries are willing to be tryed by in this businesse.

(See the Confession of Dr. Twiss. in Vin. dic. Grat. l. 1. Dign. 8. Se^{ct}. 4. p. 110.)

20. From all this together which hath been said from Scri-
 pture, from Reason, from the authority of the Ancients (who
 are the fittest of any to interpret Scripture) I thus conclude
 within my self. That God Almighty is the Author of men and
 Angels. That wicked Angels and wicked men are the Authors
 of sin; and that the sin of men and Angels is the Author of
 unexpressible and endlesse punishment. That sin is rebellion
 against the Majesty of God: that hell was made to punish Re-

The result of all.
 Ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἀν-
 θρώποι ποίησι,
 διὰ τὸτο καὶ
 αὐτοὶ ἀμάρ-
 τάνουσιν, ἔδ'
 ἀνὰ σὺνείδης, οἱ
 θεοὶ ἐποίησαν.

Plotin. Enn. l. 2. p. 263.

Ἀυθαίρετα πῦματ' ἔχουσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι, καὶ πῶς τλήμο-
 νες καὶ τάλανες ταῖς ἰαντῶν αἰδέσεισι θύου. Hierocl. οἷς τὰ χυσο. ἔπ. p. 258.

bels;

bel; and that God never decreed any rebellion against himself. Upon which it follows, that as I look for the cause of my election in the sole merits of my Redeemer, so for the cause of my Reprobation in the obliquity of my will: because the Reason of my punishment is to be taken from my sin; and the Reason of my sin is to be taken from my self. From whence there follows (and follow it will, do what I can) a second Inference from my first, compared with my first Principle, viz.

CHAP. III.

*The second
Inference.*

21. That every Reprobate is prædetermin'd to eternal punishment, not by Gods irrelative, but conditional Decree.

Explain'd.

GOD doth punish no man under the notion of a *Creature*, but under the notion of a *Malefactor*: And because he does not create a malefactor, but a *man*, he hateth nothing that he hath created, but in as much as it hath wilfully (as it were) uncreated his image in it. So that no man is sinful, because ordain'd to condemnation; but ordain'd to condemnation, because he is sinful. Sin is foreseen, and punishment is foreappointed: but because that sin is the cause of punishment, and that the cause is not after, but before the effect (in priority of nature, though not of time) it follows that the effect is not foreappointed, untill the cause is foreseen. So that God damns no man by an absolute decree, (that is to say) without respect or intuition of sin; but the præscience of the guilt is the motive and inducement to the determining of the Judgement. And yet however my second Inference is depending upon my first by an essential tie, which gives it the force and intrinsic form of demonstration; yet (because some Readers will assent much sooner to a plain Reason lesse convincing, than to a more convincing Reason lesse plain; and that some are wrought upon, by an argument exactly proportion'd to their capacities or tempers, rightly levell'd and adopted more by luckiness than design, whilst another argument is displeasing, they know not why, but that there is an odnesse in the look and meen, which betokens something of subtilty, and

and makes them suspect there is a *serpent*, though they see not the *Ambush* in which it *larks*) I will gratifie such a Reader by a proof of this too; first from *Scripture*, then from *Reason* (grounded upon *Scripture*), and last of all by an addition to my former suffrages of *Antiquity*: in which S. *Austin* more especially shall speak as plainly, and as strongly in my behalf, as any man that can be *brib'd* to be an *Advocate*, or a witness.

22. That my proof from *Scripture* may be the more effectual, I shall first desire it may be considered, that since God is affirmed to have a *secret* and a *revealed will*, we must not preposterously interpret what we read of his *revealed will*, by what we *conjecture* of his *secret* one: (for that were to go into the *dark* to judge of those *Colours* which are seen only by the *light*) but we must either not *conjecture* at that which cannot be known, (as Gods *secret will* cannot be, but by ceasing to be *secret*) or if we needs will be so *busie*, we must *gnesse* at his *secret will* by what we know of his *revealed* one, that so at least we may *modestly* and *safely* erre. Upon which it follows, that we, who meekly confesse we have not been of Gods *Counsels*, must onely judge of his *eternal and impervestigable Decrees* by what we find in his *Word* concerning his *Promises* and his *Threats*; which are fitly called the *Transcripts* or *Copies* of his *Decrees*. Such therefore as are his *Threats*, such must needs be his *Decrees*: (because the one cannot *pravaricate* or *evacuate* the other) but his *Threats* (as well as *Promises*) are all *conditional*; therefore his *Decrees* must be so too. Thus in his *Covenant* with *Adam* (and indeed the word *Covenant* doth evince what I am speaking) he *threatens* Death, or decrees it, (not with that *peremptory Reason*, which is the *redoubling* of the *will* onely, I will therefore because I will, but) on supposition of his *eating* the *forbidden fruit*. Which was not therefore *forbidden*, that *Adam* might sin in the *eating*; (man was not so *ensnared* by the *guide* of his *youth*) but *Adam* sinned in the *eating*, because it had been *forbidden*. Such immediately after was Gods language to *Cain*, [If thou do well, thou shalt be accepted, and if thou doest not well, sin lyeth at the door.] Again (saith God by the mouth of *Moses*) Behold, I set before you this Day a *Blessing* and a *Curse*. A *blessing*, if ye obey; and a *Curse*, if ye will

Proved by
Scripture.

Gen. 2.17.

Chap. 4. v. 7.
Deut. 11. 26,
27.

will not obey. That is the form of making *Covenants* betwixt God and *man* every where throughout the Scripture: and according to the *fulfilling* or *not fulfilling* of the *Condition*, the *Righteous Iudge* of all the *world* proceeds to *sentence*. Which that we may not so much as *doubt* of; He (by a merciful *Anthropopathia*) is pleased to speak *like one of us*. "I will goe down now and see, whether they have done altogether according to the *civ* of it; and if not, I will know. There is an expression of God to *Eli* (1 Sam. 2. 30.) which shews his will sometimes is either *not absolute*, or *not immutable*. "I said indeed that the House of thy Father should walk before me for ever. But now the Lord saith, Be it far from me. Which words do not argue any *sicklenesse* in his *Will*, but demonstrate his *Promise* to have been *conditional*: there was an [*If*] *implied*, though not *expressed*, and so it appears by the very next words. This is also the style that is used in the *New Testament*. "If thou shalt confesse with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart, &c. thou shalt be saved. From whence it follows, that *if* thou shalt *not* confesse with thy mouth, *nor* believe in thine heart, &c. *thou shalt be damn'd*. "If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. If we suffer, we shall also reign; if we deny him, he also will deny us. I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit fornication with her into great tribulation, *except they repent* (Rev. 2. 22.) *If ye believe not that I am he*, ye shall die *in your sins*, Joh. 8. 24. In a word, the very end of Christs coming into the world, was to *save us from our sins*, (Mat. 1. 21.) *to redeem us from all iniquity*, (Tit. 2. 14.) He came to deliver us indeed out of the hand of our enemies, but to the end that we might serve him in holiness and righteousness all the daies of our lives. (Luke 1. 74, 75.) Now the *end* (we know) is the *prime condition*, the *greatest requisite* of all; which to neglect without repentance, is the *true cause* of *condemnation*: for so runs the *sentence* of our Saviour (Mat. 25. 41.) "Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire. Why? for what *Reason*? He gives the *true reason* in the next verse, (not because ye were *Reprobated* by an *absolute Decree*; not because ye were *ordain'd* to be *vessels of wrath* by a meer *irrespective* and *inexorable will*; but) "because I was hungry and ye gave me no meat, because I was thirsty and ye gave

Gen. 18. 21.

Rom. 10. 9.

Mat. 6. 15.

2 Tim. 2. 12.

Rev. 2. 22.

Job. 8. 24.

2 The. 1. 7, 8.

Mat. 16. 16.

Mat. 1. 21.

Tit. 2. 14.

Luk. 1. 74, 75

Mat. 25. 41,

42.

"gave me no drink. (Which yet they could not have given him, if it had not been *given* them from above to *give*.) From which, and a thousand such Texts besides, I do thus state the matter betwixt me and my self. That no man is *infinitely punished* by an *unavoidable necessity*, but for *not doing his Duty*; nor because he *cannot*, but *will not do it*. *Impossibility* is not a *sin*; and therefore no man is *punished* for *not doing that* which it is *impossible* for him to do. It was the cruelty of *Adonibezek* Iu'g. 1. 7. to cut off mens Thumbs, and then to make it *their task* to *gather up meat under the Table*. A greater cruelty in *Pharaoh*, to require a *Tale of Brick*, where he gave *no straw*. Whereas the *Master* we *serve*, will "render to every man according Rom. 2. 6, "to his works. With him there is no respect of persons. But II. "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap. And therefore Gal. 6. 7. let us not *sin*, under pretence that all we do is by an *absolute Decree*: (an opinion brought, amongst other *Merchandise*, out of *Turkie* into *Christendome*, and would be rooted out in the next *Reformation*) for every such sinner is his own worst *Satan*, "he seeks out death in the error of his way, and pulls "upon himself destruction with the works of his hands. Wisd. 1. 12.

Other proofs out of Scripture, (and perhaps, to some, more convincing) will be found interweaved in my following proofs.

23. I must next confirm this truth by *Reason*: and because Proved secondly by Reason. this *Reason* will be *manifold*, I will make it my endeavour to * Note, Reader, that the execution of Gods Decree justly answering to his Decree, doth shew the reason of the Reasons which now ensue; and is therefore noted in this third Edition, because be brief in each. Whereof the *first* shall be *taken* * from the nature of punishment, which (as before I signified) does presuppose a sin; sin does imply a breach of Law; and this again does imply at once a rational and a voluntary agent. Which seems to me to be the Reason, why God is not offended with the Cru- elty of the Bear, or with the Pride of the Peacock, or with the Thievery of the Fox. This is the reason, why the Earth does not sin by breeding Thorns and Thistles † against its primitive institution. For the ground cannot be punished, and was not cursed for its own but for Adam's sake. (Gen. 3. 17, 18.) And lastly, this is the Reason, why the Tower of Siloe was not damn'd for committing murder. Man is an Agent very at last dissem- bled their comprehensions, because they found no other way of escape. † Gen. 3. 17, 18

capable of a *Law*, and so of *sin*, and so of *punishment*; and is therefore punished, not because he *could not*, but because he *could help it*, by that *goodness of God* which would have led him to *Repentance*, if he had not *despised the riches of his goodness*. Man is punished because he *would sin*, and not because he *could not but sin*.

24. My *second Reason* is taken from the *nature of a Covenant*, which ever implies a *Condition*: now when the *first Covenant* was broken, God *immediately made a second*; not with a *part*, but with *all mankind*. And this is observable in the *Title of our Gospel* [*ἡ γὰρ Διαθήκη*]; which though we render the [*New Testament*] we might better render the [*New Covenant*], which cannot be without *Conditions*. *Heaven and Hell* are set before us: the performance of *Faith and Obedience* is that important *condition*, without which as the former will not be had, so cannot the latter be avoided.

25. My *third Reason* is taken from the *unlimited Generality* whereby *Promises and Threats, Rewards and Punishment, Exhortations and Dehortations*, are exhibited to * *all*. The Gospel is commanded to be preached to *all*; and it is published in writing that *all* may read and believe. *Baptisme, Repentance, and Remission of sins* are commanded to be offered to *all in general*, even to them that *refuse both the Word and the Preachers*; who when they are refused (and not before) are to *shake the Dust off their feet for a Testimony against them*. Now *preachings* would be *vain*, and *exhortations* would be *deceitful*, if *life and death* did not depend upon *submitting or refusing* to be amended by them.

26. My *fourth Reason* is taken from the *Degrees of Damnation*. Some shall be beaten with *many stripes*, and some with *fewer*; some shall have a *lesse*, and some a *greater Condemnation*. It shall be worse for *Chorazin* than for *Tyre*, worse for *Bethsaida* than for *Sidon*, worse for *Capernaum* than for *Sodoma*, worse for the *Jews* than for the *Ninivites*; which is not because one had a greater *Necessity* of sinning than the other, but one was guilty of the *greater Contempt*; not because God had *absolutely decreed a greater punishment* to the one, but because the one had *means of sinning lesse* than the other. For our Saviour saies

* Rev. 22. 17.

Act. 17. 27.

Mat. 28. 19.

Luke 24. 47.

John 20. 31.

Luke 9. 5.

Luke 12. 47.

Cap. 20. 7.

47.

Mat. 23. 20.

23. 23. 24.

Mat. 10. 15.

Sect. 26. to be in fore-sight and respect of Sin.

37

saies expressly, that if the *mightry works* which were done in *Chorazin* and *Bethsaida* had been also done in *Tyre* and *Sidon*, they would have repented in *sackcloth and ashes*. Which was as much as to tell them, that it was not at all for want of *means and mercy* on Gods part, but for want of *will* on *theirs*, that they did not do what was *commanded* to be done.

And therefore our Saviour *did upbraid them, because they repented not*, (Matth. 11. 20.) which he could not have done, had it been *impossible* for them to have repented. Our blessed Saviour was too *pittiful*, and of too *sweet a disposition*, to *jeer* a poor Creature for being *such* as God made him, or for being *such* as he could not but be, whether by *fatal*, or by *natural infirmity*. We esteem it an *ill nature* to upbraid a *stammerer* for not *speaking plain*; nor is any man *reproached* for being *naturally*, but *wilfully blind*; nor for being *born deaf*, but for being like the *Adder that stoppeth her ears*. He that *bindes my feet*, and then *invites me to come to him*, intends me nothing for *entertainment*, but a *salted Sarcasme*, or *bitter Jest*; for if he were *serious*, he would set my feet at *liberty*, that I might come in *good earnest*, and not say to me, as we say to a child that is *fallen down*,

[*Come hither to me, and I will lift thee up.*] And yet this Mr. Calvin is fain to say, (having been first of all engaged in that opinion) "That so many nations of men, together with

"their infants, were involv'd, without remedy, in eternal punishment, by the fall of *Adam*, for no imaginable reason, but "that so it seemed good in the sight of God: and being pincht with that Text (*Ezek. 18. 23.*) "Have I any pleasure at all "that the wicked should die, and not that he should return "from his wayes and live? he is fain to say, That God wils not "the Death of a sinner, so far forth as he wils his Repentance; "which experience teacheth us he doth so will, as not to "touch his heart that he may repent. Which is all one as to say, He wils it so, as to command it; but he does not will it so as to leave it possible: (that is) he wils it in *shew*, but not in *reality*. Nor do I know any way possible for Mr. Calvin to escape those *ugly sequels*, but by saying [that the sinner may repent by the strength and force of *Nature*, without the touch of his heart by the *grace of God*.] which is to shelter himself under the *Heresie of Pelagius*. Solomon gives us a more rational

John 3. 19.
Psalm 58. 4.

Calvin. in In-
stitut. l. 3. cap.
23. Sect. 7.

Morem non
vult Deus, in
quantum vult
penitentiam;
sed experien-
tia docet, ita
eam velle, ut
cor peccatoris
non tangat. I-
dem in Ezek.
18.

Prov. 1. 26.
29.

account, why wisdom one day will laugh at mens calamities, and mock when their fear cometh; even because they hated knowledge, and did not chuse the fear of the Lord.

* Luke 19.
13, 20.

27. My fifth Reason is taken from the nature of Death, as that does signifie Privation, and as Privation supposes a former Habit. A stone is said to be *not alive*, because it suffers the Negation of life, but a stone cannot properly be said to be *dead*, because it doth not suffer the Privation of life. So that when a man is said in Scripture to be spiritually *dead* in trespasses and sins, he is imply'd by that expression to have been spiritually *alive*. And no man is damn'd for the Negation, but the Privation of Grace; because the Negation of Grace would be Gods work, whereas the Privation of it is his own. It having formerly been shew'd, That God doth not punish his own work in man, but man is punisht for his own work; not for Gods illiberality, but for his own being a prodigal; not because no Talent was given him, but because he * squandered it away. Sin is properly the death of Grace; Death is a privation; a privation is of a habit. So that every sinner had grace, for this very Reason that he hath lost it; he was *alive*, for this very Reason that he is *dead*. He came *alive* out of Gods hands, but he falls desperately by his own. A man may be *dead born*, but he cannot possibly be *dead begotten*; deprived of life he cannot be in the very Act of his conception. A man can no more be created a sinner, than he can be generated a dead man: which infers the Condition of Gods Decree.

1 Ioh. 2. 2.

28. My sixth Reason is taken from Christs having bought those very men (2 Pet. 2. 1.) whose damnation did not slumber (v. 3.) I have proved already, Christ died for all that were dead in Adam, from (2 Cor. 5. 14.) and from several other Texts. Which he could not be truly affirm'd to do, if any one had been past by, by an absolute Praterition. For that any man doth perish for whom Christ dyed, is from his own sin, and not from Adams, if to free us from Adams it was that Christ dyed. Which as it hath been already proved, so it may be confirmed from other Scriptures: as from 1 Iohn 2. 2. where he is called the propitiation not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world. The Apostle foresees and confutes the Heresie of Christs dying onely for the Elect, with a not onely, but also. He dyed for Infidels &c
im-

impenitent, as the whole stream of the *Fathers* conclude from those words, *Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ dyed.* And shall thy weak brother perish for whom Christ dyed? That this was the Judgement of the primitive Church, I can prove by an *Induction*; and though I now spare my Reader, yet I shall trouble him hereafter, if I am challeng'd to it. I shall at present refer him to the 31. Article of our Church of England. [The oblation of Christ once made is a perfect Redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, as well Original as Actual.] I had almost forgot a special Testimony of S. John, who calls the *Messias* [the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.] So that if any man is in the dark, it is not for want of Light, but because he will not see, (as S. Chrysostome infers;) which is the very interpretation that S. John himself gives it (chap. 3. ver. 19.) "This (says he) is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darknesse rather than light, because their deeds were evil. Sure that which is the Reason of their Condemnation, was the Condition upon which they were determin'd to be damn'd: than which I know not what can be said either more plainly, or more convincingly of any subject whatsoever.

Rom. 14. 15.
1 Cor. 8. 11.

Ioh. 1. 9.

Cap. 3. v. 19.

29. My seventh Reason is taken from the conditional Decrees of temporal Death, and other temporal punishments; which are so evidently conditional, as I cannot believe any Creature will deny it. For the Denuntiations of destruction to Nineveh, and of certain death to Hezekiah, do put this quite out of all scruple: for the first was not destroyed, and the second did not die, at that determinate time when God had threatned they should. Of which no reason can be given, but that Gods Purposes, and Decrees, & Threats were conditional: on supposition of their Impenitence he threatned to destroy, and therefore on sight of their Repentance he promis'd to preserve. And from hence it is natural to argue thus. Is God so merciful to bodies? and is he lesse merciful to souls? Does he decree temporal Iudgements conditionally, because he is pitiful? and will he decree eternal ones absolutely, meerly because he will? Is he so unwilling to inflict the first death, and will he shew his power, his absolute power in the second? Did he spare the Ninevites in this life, because they

Ier. 18. 3. 4, 10.
2 King. 20. 5.

they were *penitent*? and will he *dann* them in the *next*, because they were *Heathens*; by his *peremptory Decree*? Is he *milde* in *small things*, & *severe* in the *greatest*? Is there no other way to understand those Texts in the 9. to the *Romans*, than by making those Texts which sound *severely*, to clash against those that sound *compassionately*? Is it not a more *sober* & a more *reasonable Course*, to interpret *hard* and *doubtfull* Texts by a far greater number more *clear* and *easie*, than perversly to interpret a *clear* Text by a *doubtfull* one, or an *easie* Text by one that's *difficult*? which is to *show* the light by the *darknesse*. Or if some Texts have *two senses*, if some Texts are liable to *many mores*, must we *needs* take them in the *worst*? and that in *meer contradiction* to the *universall Church*? If I had no other argument against an *absolute Reprobation*, this one were sufficient to prevail with me, That *that Father of mercies*, and *God of all consolation*, who *spareth* when we *deserve punishment*, did not *determine* us to *punishment without any respect* to our *indefervings*. He that had mercy upon wicked *Ahab* meerly because of his *Attrition*, did not *absolutely dann* him before he had done either *good* or *evil*, before the *foundations of the world were laid*. He doth not *afflict willingly*, nor *grieve the children of men*, (Lam. 3. 33.) much lesse doth he *dann* them for his *meer will and pleasure*. When God doth execute a *temporall punishment* upon such as *already have deserv'd it*, he comes to it with *reluctation*, (*עֲשֵׂה בְּרָצוֹן יְהוָה*) and therefore calls it his *strange work*; a work he loves not to be acquainted with: a work which he doth sometimes execute, because he is *lust*; but still *unwillingly*, because he is *compassionate*. And he therefore so expresses it, as we are wont to do a thing we are not *w'd* to, and know not *how* to set about: [How
Hos. 11. 8, 9. shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israel? how shall I make thee as *Admah*? how shall I set thee as *Zeboim*? Mine heart is turn'd within me, my *repentings*
Exod. 32. 14. are kindled together, I will not execute the *fiercenesse* of mine anger, for I am God, and not man.] Now that God doth profess to *afflict unwillingly*, and many times to *repent him of the evil which he thought to do unto his people*, is a demonstrative argument of his *Conditionall decrees* in things *Temporall*, & by a greater force of Reason in things *Eternall*.
My

30. My eighth Reason is taken from the little flock which belongs to God, and the numerous herd which belongs to Belial; which would not have been, if they had both been measur'd out by a most absolute Decree. For when it pleas'd the Divine goodnesse to suffer death upon the Crosse for all the sins of the world, (the every drop of whose blood had been sufficiently precious to have purchased the Redemption of ten thousand Adams, and ten thousand worlds of his posterity) he would not yield the major part unto his Rival Rebel, the black prince of darknesse, reserving to himself the far lesser portion; and all this irrespectively, meerly because he would. He would not absolutely determin^e such a general harvest of wheat and tares, as freely to yield the Devil the greater crop. He would not suffer his Justice so to triumph over his Mercy, who loves that his Mercy should rejoyce against Indgement. It was not for want of a new Instance to shew his Power, or his Justice; for they were both most eminent in the great Mystery of Redemption. Much greater instances and arguments than an absolute Decree; as I could evidently shew, if I were but sure of my Readers patience. 1am. 2. 13.

My ninth Reason is taken from the Reprobation of Angels, which was not irrespectively, but in regard to their Apostasie, as is and must be confessed by all who place the object of Reprobation in *massa corrupta*. For the overthrowing of which tenent (in all the *Sublapsarians*) Dr. Twisse himself does thus argue: "Si Deus non potuit Angelos reprobare, nisi ut contumaces, ergo nec homines, nisi ut in contumacia perseverantes. De Prædest. Digres. 4. Sect. 4. c. 2.

31. My tenth Reason is taken from the absurdities which have, and still must follow, if Gods eternal decree of mans misery is not conditional, but absolute. And those absurdities are discernable by this following Dilemma.

Let Dives be suppos'd to be the man that is damn'd. It is either because he sins, or meerly because God will have it so. If for the first Reason, [because he sins] then sin is the cause of his damnation, and consequently before it. From whence it follows, that Dives is not damn'd meerly because God will have it

it so; but that God will have it so, because he *sins*. (Which plainly shews the conditional Decree.) But if it be said that it is for the [second Reason, meerly because God will have it so,] then that absolute Decree to have it so doth either necessitate him to *sin damnably*, or it does not. First, if it does, then how can *Dives* be guilty of that thing, of which Gods absolute Decree is the peremptory Cause? Or how can that be guilty, which is necessity? (*Dives* could as little have cherished *Lazarus*, as the Tower of *Silae* could have spared the *Galileans*, if his will had been no more free, than that Tower had a will.) And secondly, if it does not necessitate him to *sin damnably*, then *Dives*, who is damn'd, might possibly have not been damn'd. From whence it follows, that *Dives* is not damn'd absolutely, but in regard to his *sins*. (Which had they not been his choice, they had not been his, but his that did chuse them. And it is a contradiction to say, a man chuses any thing without a free will, or by an absolute necessity, which is, whether he will or no.) Besides, if God did absolutely decree the end, which is *damnation*, and consequently the means, which is *final impenitence*; these Absurdities would follow. First, it would be a *Reprobates* duty to be damn'd. And to endeavour his salvation would be a *sin*: because it were striving against the stream of Gods absolute Will. If all men are to chuse, and withall to execute the will of God, and that it is Gods will the greatest part shall be damn'd; it will then be a duty in the greatest part of men, to go industriously to Hell: and to do good will be a *vice*, because it tends *Heaven-wards*, and so to the crossing of an absolute irreversible decree. Which since I have considered, I have lesse wondered than I was wont, at the conclusion of *Carpocrates*, that "the very worst of Actions are out of duty to be performed: and that the soul shall be punished with its imprisonment in the body, until she hath filled up the number of her iniquities; according to that Text, *Mat. 5.29*. Which we call *Iniquities*, but they *Duties*. And so indeed they would be, if every thing in the world (the means as well as the end) were absolutely ordained, and by consequence effected by God (blessed for ever) who can ordain nothing but good. And such *sin* and *Hell* must be [exceeding good] if they could possibly be ordained by

by as absolute a decree, as the Heavens and the earth, the water and the air, of which God said, *they are very good*. Secondly, Gods revealed will being that all should repent, and his secret will being that very few shall, it follows thence, That it is his will that his will should not be done; and that God hath one will which is the same with the Devils; and that when a Reprobate saies in the *Pater noster* [thy will be done] he vehemently prays for his own damnation. Which things, as they were fallably objected in France against S. Austin, so Prospers way to excuse him, was to make protestations against any such Tenent as conditional Reprobation. He sayes the very things in his *Masters vindication*, which I have said in my own; and calls the sequels of that Opinion, which he disowns, most sottish blasphemies, and not only prodigious, but Devilish lies. But he denies not that such ill consequences will follow upon the bold assertion of irrelative Reprobation, which he does therefore very distinctly and very earnestly disclaim. And he doth so much speak the very minde of S. Austin, that he seems sometimes to speak out of his mouth too: it being hard to say, whether the *Answers to the Objections of Vincentius* doe truly belong to the Master or to the Scholar, they being inserted in both their Works; and that which is called *Prospers by Vossius*, is ascribed to S. Austin by *Ludovicus Lucius*. If I have made any unfriendly or injurious inference, I will instantly retract it upon the least conviction that it is so. But truly the Reasons which I have given, have serv'd to confirm me in my adherence to my second inference: which I yet farther prove by the remaining votes of Antiquity. For though my former Citations are all to this purpose, yet I will not repeat them, but adde some others (perhaps more fully and indisputably) to the number.

32. * And first I will set down the Confession of Mr. Calvin, "That † the Schoolmen and Ancients are wont to say, [Gods Reprobation of the wicked is in præsience of their wickednesse] but he professes to believe (with one more modern) "that God foresaw all future things by no other means, than because he decreed they should be made, or done.

Ineptissima blasphemie, Prodigiousa mendacia, Diabolici mendaciorum indiculus. Leguntur apud Prosp. in Præfat. Respons. ad object. Vinc.

* Proved thirdly by Antiquity. † Solent veteres &c. & Scholastici in ea acquiescent, &c. Non a'ia ratione qua futura sunt prævident, nisi quia ita ut fierent decrevit. Calvin. Instit. l. 3 23. Sect. 6.

Nec absurdum videri debet, Dum non modo primi hominis casum, & in eo posterorum ruinam previdisse, sed arbitrio quoque suo dispensasse. Idem ibid. Sect. 7.

“Nor ought it (*saieth he*) to seem absurd, that God did not onely foresee, but by his will appoint the fall of Adam, and in him of his posterity. The *Ancients*, he confessed, were quite of another mind: but because he addes [*dubitanter*] and would have it thought that S. *Austin* was for his turn, I will set down some of *their* words, and begin with *Aunam* *prævidisse*, *stins*.

Nemo eligitur nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejicitur: Unde quod dictum est [quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem]

non video quomodo sit dictum, nisi de præscientia Fidei & operum præstatis. & mox---Iacobus non electus est ut fieret bonus, sed bonus factus eligi potuit. Augustin. ad Simplicianum l. i. quæst. 2.

33. No man is chosen unless as differing from him that is rejected. Nor know I how it is said [that God hath chosen us before the foundation of the world] unlesse it be meant of his prescience of faith and good works---*Iacob* was not chosen that he might be made good, but having been seen to be made good, was capable of being chosen.

If S. *Austin* was so distinctly for *Conditional Election* (and in those very works too, which he afterwards writ as very sufficient to confute *Pelagius*) he was infinitely rather for *Conditional Reprobation*; as any man knows that knows any thing of him, and may be seen in the same book to *Simplician*.

Noluit ergo Esau, & non cucurrit. Sed etsi voluisset, & cucurrisset, Dei adjutorio pervenisset, nisi vocatione contempta reprobus fieret. Id. in l. ad Sim.

Esau would not, and did not run; for if he had, he had attained by the help of God; unlesse he would be made a *Reprobate* by a contempt of his vocation.

Nūquid iniquitas est apud Deum? absit. Iniquum enim videtur, ut sine ullis bonorum malorumve operum meritis, unum Deus eligat, od atq; alterum. Id. in Enchirid. cap. 98.

It seems unjust, that without the merits of good or evil works, God should love one, and hate another.

Non necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia prædestinati non sunt; sed ideo prædestinati non sunt, quia tales fuerunt ex voluntariis prævaricationibus præsciti sunt. Prosp. ad Gallorum cap. 3. edit. Basil. 1521.

Wicked men had no necessity of perishing from their not being elected; but they were not therefore elected, because they were fore-seen to be wicked through their own wilful prevarication.

God

Sect. 34. to be in fore-sight and respect of Sin.

45

God foresaw that they would fall by their own proper will, and for that very reason did not separate them by election from the sons of perdition.

Illos ruituros propria ipsorum voluntate praeservit, & ob hoc a filiis Perditionis nulla praedestinatione discrevit. Id. ibid. ad cap. 76

God is the Creator of all men, but no man was created to the end that he may perish.

Omnium quidem hominum. Deus Creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est ut pereat. Idem ad object. Vinc. 3.

34. I have given the more Testimonies out of Prosper, because he is known to have been the Scholar and vindicator of S. Austin. And to produce their suffrages is to imply all the rest; they having been the only Ancients whom their contentions against Pelagianisme made to speak sometimes to the great disadvantage of their own opinion, as they do not stick to confesse themselves: and we ought in all reason to take that for their Iudgement, which we find delivered by themselves by way of Apology and vindication. But though I need not, I will adde some others.

He therefore brought the means of Recovery to all, that whosoever perisht might impute it to himself, who would not be cur'd, when he had a Remedy whereby he might.

Ideo omnibus opera sanitatis demisit, ut quicumque perierit, mortis suae causas sibi ascribat, qui curari noluit, cum remedium haberet quo posset evadere. Ambros. lib. 2. de Cain & Abel cap. 13.

Even they that shall be wicked have power given them of Conversion and Repentance.

Etiā his qui mali sint futurum, datur potestas conversionis & poenitentiae. Hieron. lib 3. adversus Pelagianos.

Gods love and hatred arises from his prescience of things to come, or from the quality of mens works.

Dilectio & odium Dei vel ex praescientia nascitur futurorum, vel ex operibus. Idem ad Malach. 1.

If the day is equally born for all, how much rather is Jesus Christ? -- When every man is called to a participation of the gift, what is the reason, that what God hath equally distributed should by humane interpretation be any way lessened?

Si dies aequaliter nascitur omnibus, quanto magis Christus? --- Cum singuli ad donarium vocentur, quid est ut quod a Deo aequaliter distribuitur, humana interpretatione minuat? Cyprian. Epist. 76.

* *Pater omni-
bus sensu vita:
neque ab jure
potandi quis-
quam prohibe-
tur aut pelli-
tur. Arnob. ad-
versus Nat.
lib. 2.*

* The fountain of life lies open to all : nor is any man for-
bid or hindred from the right of drinking.

Let Dr. Twisse himself be heard to speak in this matter, and
that against *Piscator* (both *Ansiarminians*.) “ *Damnatio est*
“ *actus Judicis, & procedere debet secundum justitiam vindi-*
“ *cativam : at ne vestigium quidem Justitiæ apparet in damna-*
“ *tione Reprobatorum. (He speaks of absolute irrespctive Re-*
“ *probation, which Piscator set up.) “ Nam justitia neminem*
“ *damnat nisi merentem. At esse reprobum, nequaquam signifi-*
“ *cat mereri damnationem. Sola Damnatio peccatoris splen-*
“ *dere facit dei Justitiam. Twissus in vind. Gr. de Præd. l. 1.*
Digr. 1. Sect. 4. p. 57.

35. *Time and paper would fail me, and sufficient patience*
would fail my Reader, if I should make repetition of all I find
to my purpose. For whatsoever hath been spoken by the Fa-
thers of universal Redemption, doth diametrically oppose the
irrespective Reprobation. And to reckon up their verdicts in
that behalf, were to ingage my self and my Reader in a new
Ocean of employment. I hope the account that I have given of
my belief in this matter is a sufficient Apologie for my belief,
and may at least excuse, though not commend me. Rather
than offend any man who takes me upon Trust to be unsound
in my principles, I have made this excuse for being orthodox:
and do humbly desire to be forgiven, if I shall still adhere to
that doctrine, which by Scripture, and Reason, and the Autho-
rity of my Teachers, I am verily perswaded is the truest and
the most safe: (to wit,)

*The sum of all
that hath been
said.*

1. That *man* himself is the Cause of his *sin*.
2. That *sin* is properly the Cause of its punishment.
And by consequence,
3. That *man* is the procurer of his own Misery.
And by consequence,
4. That Reprobation is a conditional thing.

Not decreed by God Almighty to shew his *absolute power*,
but to shew his power in the exercise of his *Justice* : not deter-
min'd before, but because of his *præscience* ; nor without re-
gard or respect, but in relation to *sin*, in *fore sight*, and *hated*,
and *requital* of it, as of an injury, on which damnation is
pre-

preordained, by way of Recompence and Revenge. And therefore the last day is call'd a day of *Judgement*, as well as of *perdition*; and the Judge himself is called, the Lord God of *Recompence*. And when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed in flaming fire, it shall be to take *vengeance* on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Now that which is the *motive* to the taking of *vengeance*, was also the *motive* to the making of the decree. He who therefore takes *vengeance*, because they obey not the Gospel of Christ, did for the very same Reason, decree to take it. Which to me is *Demonstration* that the Decree is conditionall. *3. reg. 2. 1. 8.*

36. I have nothing now of *duty* that lies upon me to be done, but that I descend to the second ground of my *Belief*. But for the love of *Charity* and *Reconcilement*, I will endeavour to take a course of making some *composition* with my *Dissenters*. If they will but come up to my most *reasonable demands*, we will not strive about *words* and *phrases*; so small a thing shall never part us. I will swallow the word [*Necessity*], so I may take it down with a grain of salt. I will say with Dr. *Whitaker* (in his 4. Article at Lambeth,) "That they who are not predestin'd to salvation, shall be necessarily damned, (*but*) for their sins (as he himself speaks.) I allow my self to be no wiser than Bishop *Andrews*, (the strings of whose Books I am not worthy to *untie*) who interprets *necessario*, not by an absolute *Necessity*, but by a *Necessity* which follows sin. They shall be damned for their sins; that is, for that very Reason because they have sinned, not for that only Reason, because they are not predestin'd. And because that Reverend (I know not whether more learned, or Saint-like) Man, allow'd himself to be no wiser than all the *Fathers* and *Schoolmen* that went before him, he thought 'twas fit to abstain from [*such new phrases*] such new phrases and wayes of holding forth and making out the ancient doctrines of the Church; and therefore instead of [*necessity*] to say [*without doubt*]. And for my own part, I desire to be no deeper, and to speak no better language, than all the *Fathers* of the Church (who have gone to Heaven with those opinions, for which I am censur'd by some to Hell;) I chuse to say [a *Conditional*, not an absolute *Necessity*].

An obvious expedient to reconcile dissenters.

Qui non sunt predestinati ad salutem, necessario propter peccata condemnabuntur. Art. Lamb. 4. Atq; id necessario, (si sic loqui placeat) sed necessitate ex hypothesi, non absolutâ; Id est, ideo quia peccarunt, non autem ideo quia non sunt predestinati. Epist. Wiat. Iud. de art. Lamb.

The probable
cause of the
Dissention is a
mistake of
Gods præs-
cience.

37. If I may guesse (without censure) at the *cause* of other mens *mistakes*, by that which once was mine own, I shall ascribe much of it to the vulgar *misconception* of Gods *præs-
cience* or *fore-sight*; which being *constant* and *infallible*, seems to give a *necessity* to all *events*, which are the objects of that *præs-
cience*. And this must certainly be the reason, (I at least must *so conjecture*, who can think of no better, and did my self once *stumble* upon this very stone) why Mr. Calvin will have Gods *præs-
cience* to succeed his *præordination*. The ground of which error does so border upon *Truth*, as to lessen the wonder, why men of good parts should so frequently *mis-
take* it for that truth it self on which it borders; (and does unluckily verifie the *Italian Proverb*, *Troppo confina la ver-
tu col vizio*.) Gods *præs-
cience* indeed doth imply a *necessity*, which it is mistaken to have effected. And again *necessity* is not by every body *distinguisht*, as by the admirable *Boethius*, (to whom I owe my greatest *light* in this particular:) for if it were, I believe many others might be *converted*, as I have been. But before I mention (much lesse *insist* on) the *distinction*, I shall chuse to say something in *preparation* to it. It is briefly this:

The mist. ke is
endeavoured to
be rectified.

* Isa. 41. 22, 23.

Acts 15. 18.

Psal. 139. 2.

† Boethius de
consol. Philo-
soph. lib. 5.

38. That the *knowledge* of the *Eternal*, far transcending all *motion* and *succession* of *time*, does abide in the *simplicity* of its *present* being; beholding all *past* and *future* things in his *simple knowledge*, as just * *now* done. And therefore *Boethius* will have it call'd not † *Præs-
cience*, but *Science*; not *Præ-
vidence*, but *Providence*: which doth not change the *natures* and *proprieties* of things *future*, but considers them as they are, in respect of himself; which is as they shall be, in respect of *Time*. For as the *knowledge* of things *present* doth import no *necessity* on that which is done; so the *fore-
knowledge* of things *future* layes no *necessity* on that which shall be: because whosoever either *knows* or *sees* things, he *knows* and *sees* them as they are, and not as they are not. Gods *knowledge* doth not confound things, but reaches to all *events*, not only which come to passe, but as they come to passe; whether *contingently*, or *necessarily*. As (for illustration) when I see a man walk upon the earth, and at the very same instant the Sun shining in the Heavens, I see the first as *voluntary*, and the second as *natural*. And though

though at the instant that I see *both done*, there is a *necessity* that they *be done* (or else I could not see them when I do;) yet there was a necessity of *one only*, before they were done, (*viz. the Suns shining in the Heavens*) but none at all of the other, (*viz. the mans walking upon the earth.*) The Sun could not *but shine*, as being a *natural agent*; the man might not *have walked*, as being a *voluntary one*. Upon which it follows,

39. There is a *twofold necessity*; whereof one is *absolute*, and the other on *supposition*. The *absolute* is that, by which a thing *must be moved* when something *moves it*. The *Suppositive* is that, by which a man shall be *damn'd* if he die *Impenitent*. The *later necessity* (though not the *first*) does extremely well consist both with the *liberty of mans will*, and Gods *conditional Decrees*. E. G. I am now writing, and God *foresaw* that I am writing, yet it does not follow that I *must needs write*; for I can chuse. What God foresees *must necessarily come to passe*, but it must come to passe *in the same manner that he foresees it*. He foresees I will write, not of *necessity*, but *choice*; so that his *fore-sight* does not make an *absolute and peremptory Necessity*, but *infers a Necessity upon supposition*. (We must mark, in a *Parenthesis*, how great a difference there is betwixt the *making*, and the *inferring of a Necessity*.) Whatsoever I do, there is an *absolute Necessity* that God should *foresee*; yet God *foreseeing my voluntary Action*, does not make it *necessary*, but on *supposition* that it is *done*. If all things are *present to God* (as indeed they are) his *fore-sight* must needs be all one with *our sight*. As therefore when I see a man *dance as he pleases*, it is *necessary* that he *do what I see he does*; but yet my *looking on* does not *make it necessary*: so Gods *foreseeing* that man *would sin*, implied a *certainty* that so it would be, but did not make it an *absolutely necessary or involuntary thing*. For that a thing may be *certain* (in respect of its *event*) and yet *not necessary* (in respect of its *cause*), is no news at all to a considering person, who will but duly distinguish Gods *Omniscience* from his *Omnipotence*, and his *Fore-sight* from his *Decree*, and *infallible* from *necessary*, and *spontaneous* from *voluntary*, and that which *follows as a Consequence*

By the Consideration of a twofold necessity in events.

Dua sunt necessitates. Simplex una, veluti quod necesse est omnes homines esse mortales: altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est. Boeth. de cons. Phil. lib. 5.

only, from that which follows as a consequent. If I may judge by those errors, which I convince myself to have been in, when I was contrary-minded to what I am, I see as many mistakes in other men arising from the misfortune of confounding those things which I just now distinguish, as from any one unhappinesse that I can think of. And from all that I have spoken upon this last subject, it seems inevitably to follow, that a suppositive Necessity, and none else, is very consistent with a free and contingent Action. Whilest I see a man sitting, it is necessary that he sit, but upon supposition that I see him sitting, his posture is still a voluntary contingent thing. For he sate down when he would, and may arise when he pleaseth (but still vvith a proviso of Gods permission.) I desire to be taught vvhat is, if this is not, exact speaking, viz. That God by his prohibition under penalty makes my disobedience become liable to punishment; and by his Decree to permit, or not hinder me, he leaves me in the hand of mine own counsel, & so in the state of peccability, that I may sin & perish if I will. So that by his prescience that I will sin, he hath no manner of influence or causality upon my sin; vvich infers my destruction to be entirely from my self. I am a little confident, that vvhosoever shall but read Boetius his fifth book, and reading shall understand it, and understanding shall have the modesty to retract an errour, he vvill not reverence the 4. Section of the 23. chapter of the 3. book of Institutions, because it is Mr. Calvins, but vvill suspect Mr. Calvin because of that Section. The question there is [“Whether Reprobates vvere predestined to that corruption vvich is the cause of Damnation.”] To vvich he answers vvith a [Fateor] “I confesse that all the sons of Adam, by the express will of God, fell down into the misery of that condition in vvich they are fetter’d and intangled. And a little after he professeth, that no account can be given, but by “having recourse to the sole vvill of God, the cause of vvich lies “hidden vvithin it self. And that vve may not think he speaketh only of the posterity of Adam, he telleth us plainly in the close of that Section, “that no other cause can be given for the “defection of Angels, than that God did reprobate & reject “them. In this place I vvould ask, Was the Angels Defection or Apostasie, their sin, or no? If not, vvhy vvere they reprobated and

Eccius. 15. 14.

SECT. 40. by a right apprehension of Gods Will.

51

and cast into chains of darknesse? and if it were, how then is Gods Reprobation not only the chief, but the only Cause of such a sin? This is the sad effect of being enslaved to an opinion, and of being asham'd of that liberty which looks like being conquer'd. I believe the love of victory hath been the cause of as many mischiefs, as have been feigned to leap forth from Pandora's Box. Whereas, if every one that writes would but think it a noble and an honourable thing, to lead his own pride captive, to triumph over his own conceitednesse and opinionastrete, and to pursue the glory of a well-natured submission; there is perhaps hardly an Author of any considerable length, but might think he had reason to write a book of retractions. And sure it will not be immodesty for a young man to say, That many old men might have done it, with as much reason as S. Austin.

40. But as I have learnt of Boethius (that most excellent Christian, as well as Senator, and profound Divine, as well as Philosopher, who lived a Terror to Heresie, and died a Martyr for the Truth) to distinguish of Necessity; so have I learnt from other Ancients, to distinguish better of Gods will, than I was wont to do before the time of my Retraction. First, I distinguish (with S. Chrysostome) of a first and second Will. Gods first will is, that the sinner shall not die, but rather return from his wickednesse and live: his second will is, that he who refuseth to return receive the wages of iniquity. Secondly, I distinguish (with Damascene) of an antecedent and a consequent will. The antecedent is that, by which he wils that every sinner should repent: his consequent is that, by which he preordaineth the damnation of the impenitent. Which distinction is not made in respect of Gods will simply (in which there cannot be either prius or posterius) but in respect of the things which are the object of his will. For every thing is will'd by God so far forth as it is good. Now a thing consider'd absolutely may be good or evil, which in a comparative consideration may be quite contrary. E. G. To save the life of a man, is good; and to destroy a man, is evil, in a first and absolute consideration: But if a man secondly be compar'd with his having been a murderer, then to save his life, is evil, and to destroy it, good. From whence it may

And by a right Application of a twofold will in the Almighty

(Chrysost. in Epist. ad Eph. c. 1. Homil. 1.

Damascen. l. 2. Orth. Fid. c. 29.

be said of a just Judge, that by his antecedent will he desires every man should live; but by a consequent will decrees the death of the Murderer: and even then, he doth so distinguish the murderer from the man, that he wisheth the man were not a murderer, whom he condemns as murderer, and not as man; for whilest he hath a will to hang the murderer, he hath a merciful moulding to save the man. He doth not hang the man, but only because he is a murderer; and (if it lay in his power) he would destroy the murderer, to save the man. Both the one and the other is not an absolute, but a conditional will: he would save the man (with an) [if] he were not a murderer; and doth destroy the murderer (with a) because he is a Malefactor. Just so, Gods antecedent will is, that every man would repent, that they may not perish: it is his consequent will, that every one may perish who will not repent. both the one and the other is respective and conditional. Thirdly, I distinguish (with Prosper) of an inviting and revenging will. The inviting will is that, by which all are bidden to the Wedding Feast: his revenging will is that, by which he punisheth those that will not come. Or fourthly, I distinguish (with reverend Anselme) of the will of Gods mercy, and of the will of his Justice. It is the will of his Mercy, that Christ should die for the sins of all: but 'tis the will of his Justice, that all should perish who come not in to him when they are called, or who only so come, as not to continue and persevere unto the end.

41. All these distinctions come to one and the same purpose, and being rightly understood, as well as dexterously used, doe seem to me a Gladius Delphicus, sufficient to cut asunder the chiefeft knots in this Question. For the first will of God may be repeated, whereas the second is immutable: which is the ground of that Distinction betwixt the Threats and Promises under Gods Oath, and those other under his Word only: of which saith the Council of Toledo, "Jurare Dei est, a seipso ordinata nullatenus convellere; pœnitere vero, eadem ordinata, cum voluerit, immutare. When he is resolv'd to execute his purpose, he is said to swear; and when it pleaseth him to alter it, he is said to repent: for there are some decrees of God which (being conditional) do never come to passe; as he thought to have done an Evil of punishment

Prosp. in Respon. ad Obj. Vincen. sub finem.

Anselmus in Mat. cap. 6.

Concil. Tolet. 8. cap. 1.

Sect. 41. Gods Antecedent and Consequent Will.

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punishment unto Israel, which yet he did not, *Exod. 32. 14.* And the reason of this is given us from that distinction before mentioned; which also serveth to reconcile many seeming repugnances in Scripture. For when it is said, that God repenteth (*1 Sam. 16. 35.*) it is meant of the first will; and when it is said, he cannot repent (*1 Sam. 16. 29.*) it is meant of the second. In respect of the first, we are said to grieve, to quench, to resist the Spirit of God, (*1 Thess. 5. 19.*) but when it is said, who hath resisted his will? (*Rom. 9. 19.*) it is meant of the second. God's Mercy is above and before his Justice; and therefore that is his first will, that all should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth (*1 Tim. 2. 4.*) but yet so, as that his Justice is not excluded by his Mercy; and therefore that is his second will, that so many should be damned as hated knowledge, and did not chuse the fear of the Lord. (*Prov. 1. 29.*) The will of his Mercy, that all should live, is from nothing but his goodnesse; whereas the will of his Justice, that some should die, depends upon something in the Creature. (So that both parties may be gratified, they that are for the dependence, and the independency of his Will.) That the Reprobate is invited, is from the mercy of Gods Will; but that he is punished for not accepting, is from the obliquity of his own. In respect of the first, it is the man that refuseth God (*Ier. 8. 5.*) but in respect of the second, it is God that doth reprobate man. (*Rom. 1. 28.*) The free love of the Creator is the only motive to his first will; but mans ingratitude and rebellion is his impellent to the second. The first shews him a tender and compassionate Father; the second speaks him a righteous and impartial Iudge: both proclaim him a powerful and a provident God. Now can any distinction be better chosen, can any word that is equivocal be more safely understood, can any Opinion (of Gods will or mans) be more rationally, or more warily, or more religiously entertain'd, than that wherein Gods Mercy doth greet his Justice, and wherein his Love doth kisse his Power? I appeal to any man living, whether this be an Error; or if it is, whether it is not a very safe one; and if it is so, whether it is not a very small one; and if so safe, that no body can suffer by it, if so small, that no body can see it, whether the Author of this Appeal is not

Rom. 12. 18.

very excusable, both for not being able to see his own Eyes, nor to see his own Errour with other mens. As much as in me lies, I would live peaceably with all men; with those especially, who when I speak unto them thereof, make them ready to battel. And in order to that Peace, I desire them to lay this one thing to heart; that as, if I were as they, I would quit my Opinion; so if they were as I, they would not long keep their own.

CHAP.

CHAP: IV.

Free and special Grace defended against the Pelagians and Massilians in the second Principle proposed.

42.

HAVING proved hitherto that *Sin* is really the cause of Punishment, that *Man* is really the cause of *sin*, and therefore that *Man* is the grand cause of Punishment, (as being the cause of the cause of his Damnation) intending thereby to secure my self against the errors and blacker guilt of the *Manichees*, the *Marcianites*, the *Stoicks* and the *Turks*, who do all affirm (some directly, some by necessary consequence) That *Gods absolute Will* is the cause of *sin*, and *mans* onely the instrument: the second part of my Task is, to be an Advocate for the pleading and asserting the Cause of *God* too; and that against the Opiners of the other Extream, to wit, the *Pelagians* and the *Massilienses*; who, to be liberal to *Nature*, do take away from *Grace*, and to strengthen the *Handmaid*, do lessen the forces of the *Mistress*. And though I think the later to be the milder Heresie of the two, it being lesse dangerous to ascribe too much goodness to the Power of *Nature*, (which very power is undoubtedly the gift of *God*) than the very least evil to the *God* of all *Grace*, (and this according to the judgement of the *Synod* at *Orange*, which pronounced an *Anathema* upon the first Heresie, whereas it did but civilly reject the second;) yet in a perfect dislike and rejection of this later extremity, as well as of the former, my second Principle is this.

That all the good which I do, I do first receive; not from any thing in my self, but from the special Grace and Favour of Almighty *God*, who freely worketh in me, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure, Phil. 2. 13.

The second Principle or Ground of my Belief in this business.

43. That I may not be suspected of any secret reservation within my self, in the laying down of this Principle; I will endeavour to speak out, and make my Reader my Confessor, by revealing the very utmost of what I think in this business. I believe, that no man can come to Heaven any otherwise than by *Christ*; nor to *Christ*, unless it be given, (that is, unless

Explained.

Ag. 4. 12.
John 6. 44,
65.

lesse the Father draw him.) First the Father loves the Son; next he loves us in the Son; then endowes us with his Spirit; so endow'd he elects us; so elected he predestines us; so predestined he will glorifie us, by crowning his Gifts and Graces in us: I say his Graces, because they are not required by us, but *infus'd* by him; nor so properly given, as lent us; lent us as *Talents*, not to hide, but multiply. We owe it wholly to God, not that he gives us his Grace onely, but that he gives us the grace to desire his Grace, as well as to use it to the advancement of his Glory: and we are to thank him, as for all other mercies, so for this also, even that we have the grace to thank him. So far I am from that Pelagianisme whereof I have wrongfully been accused, (I beseech God not to lay it to my accusers charge) that I have never lain under any the least Temptation to any degree of that Heresie; no, no more than Fulgentius, or Prosper, or S. Austin himself. It not onely is, but ever hath been my assertion, That as we cannot spiritually be nourished, unlesse the Father of Mercies doth reach out unto us the bread of Heaven; and as we cannot take it when it is offered, unlesse he give us the hand of Faith: so cannot we possibly desire to take it, unlesse he gives us our very appetite and hunger; we cannot pant after the waters of life, unlesse he give us our very thirst. He stirs us up, when we are sleeping, that we may seek him; and shews himself, when we are seeking, that we may find him; and gives us strength, when we have found him, that we may hold him fast unto the end. There is no good thought arising in us, unlesse suggested by his (a) preventing Grace: no nor encreasing, unlesse strengthened by (b) his subsequent Grace: no nor consummate, unlesse (c) perfected by his Grace of perseverance. If I am better than any man, it is God that (d) makes me differ: Every good gift is from above, and cometh down from the father of lights. And therefore he that will glory, let him glory in the Lord, saying with the Psalmist, Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy Name give the praise.

44. Having thus secur'd my self from giving the will of man a sacrilegious liberty; I must withall provide, that I be able to answer the Objection of the Marcionites: which Tertullian could not do, but by asserting the liberty of the will; which Grace

a Phil. 1. 6. and
2. 13.
Heb 12. 2.
b Luke 19. 13,
26. a
c 1 Cor. 15.
10.
d 1 Cor. 4. 7.
Iam. 1. 17.
1 Cor. 1. 31.
Psal. 115. 1.
Reconciled
with Choice,
which is irre-
concilable
with irresist-
ibility.

Grace doth correct, but not destroy. Grace doth strengthen, but a Object. 1. not compel. Grace doth guide, but not necessitate. Grace makes si dens lon s. able to chuse good, but not unable to refuse it. (a) Marcion & prascius objected thus; "If God is good, and prascient of all the mali, & p. tens "Evill which is to come, and withall able to prevent it, why depellere, cur "did he suffer mankind to fall? why did he not hold him hominem labi fast by irresistible Grace? Tertullian answered, That God passus est? made man in his own Image, and that in nothing more live'y, Resp. Liberum, & sui arbitrii, than in the liberty of a Will: And that it is to which his & sue potesta- fall must be imputed. But (saith (b) Marcion) Man ought to tis invenio ho- have been made of such a frame, as not to be able to fall minem, & seq. away. Marry then (saith Tertullian) Man had not been b Object. 2. a voluntary, but a necessary Agent; (which is as much as Homo ita debet institui, ut non to say, a Man should not have been a Man) nor possit cadere. could he have been a right object of Reward and Punish- Resp. Ergo lo- ment. num suum habe- ret emancipa- tum sibi a Deo: Et onus aut malus necessi- ta e fuisset in- ventus, non co- luntat: Nec bene nec mali merces jure pensaetur ei.

45. Before I venture on any rational or Scholastical way of arguing, I must first enlighten my self out of some clear places of † Scripture: amongst which there is none that seems more proper, than that of S. Paul to the Philippians; "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. He bids them work, because God worketh; which they needed not have been bid to do, if God had work't after a physical irresistible manner. That they might not be betray'd into a yawning reliance upon their being superacted to the working out of their salvation, he bids them work it out with fear and trembling (as our Saviour bids us, Strive to enter in at the strait gate, because many shall strive, and shall not enter:) which they needed not have done, had their salvation been (not only certain, but withall) a necessary unavoidable thing, and so inconsistent with choice and option. But the Apostle tels them (in the next verse) that it is God which worketh in them, not only to do, but to will and to do; by his preventing Grace he worketh in them to will, by assisting Grace he worketh in them to do: by neither so irresistibly, but that they must work it out themselves too; and that not only with expectation and hope, but with fear and trembling. God worketh in us to will (saith the Apostle) not without, or against, but according to the nature of that very will with

Tertul. advers. Marc. l. 2. c. 5, 6.
† I Proved by Scripture.
Phil. 2. 12, 13.

Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur.

Alioqui ubi necessitas, ibi nec damnatio, nec corona est. Hieron. contra Jovinian. c. 2.

Valet liberum arbitrium ad bona, si divinitus adjuvetur; quid sit humiliter pet. ut lo. & faciendo. Aug. st. epist. 89. Psal. 119. 32. Iohn 8. 32. Tertull. loco citato.

* 2 Cor. 5. 20.

Deut. 30. 15, 19.

Ios. 24. 15.

† 2 Proved by Reason.

Ilud proprie dicitur irresistibile, cui resistere nemo potest, quamvis vellet.

Twiss. in pref. ad vin. Grat. Sec. 9. p. 32.

which he made us. Grace doth not destroy, but establish, and strengthen, and perfect Nature. Shall we say that we do a thing without liberty and choice, because God worketh in us to will and to do? (that is) to do it by choice and option? is the liberty lost, because it is guided and enabled to do that which is good? If I can do all things through Christ that strengthens me, then can I (through him) both refuse the evil, and chuse the good. Which would not be choice, if it were whether I would or no. And so it would be, were I unable to resist it (as I shall shew by and by in the open confession of Dr. Twisse, whose Favourers cannot be angry with one that speaks his language.) I can do all things through him that strengthens me, (saith the Apostle.) Now to strengthen, is not to necessitate; for then to strengthen would be to weaken: because to necessitate or compel with an irresistibility, is to vanquish and over-master; not to give strength, but rather to take it away. Again, our Saviour is said to tread down Satan under our feet. To what end doth he tread the Serpent down, but that we may have the freedom to trample on him? and though he doth it with his own feet, yet it is under ours. This liberty and freedom of the regenerate will is at once expressed and expounded in those words of the Psalmist, "I will run the way of thy Commandements, when thou shalt set my heart at liberty. To which is agreeable that of our Saviour, and the truth shall make you free. It being a great absurdity (in the opinion of Tertullian) "that a man should have his happiness forced on him by God Almighty. So far is God from prostituting his Blessing, by such a controlling of the will, and such an obtruding of the object, as makes the object unavoidable, that he doth not onely offer and propose it to his peoples choice, but * desires them also to chuse it. "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you " (saith God by Moses) that I have set before you life and "death, blessing and cursing. Therefore chuse life, that "thou and thy seed may live. But chuse we cannot, if God works in us irresistibly; as I will farther prove by Reason.

46.† That is properly called irresistible, which is of such an over-ruling and prevailing force, that a man cannot withstand it, although he would. (And thus Dr. Twisse hath well defin'd it.)

it.) Upon which it follows, that to *chuse irresistibly*, is a contradiction in Adjecto: For it is to *will a thing* whether one will or no. He that saith, God *worketh* in us to *chuse irresistibly*, doth say in effect, He *so worketh* in us, as that we cannot *chuse but chuse*; which is as much as to say, not only that we do what we cannot do, but that we therefore do it, because we cannot do it. He that cannot *chuse but chuse*, doth *chuse* because he cannot *chuse*; which is as bad as to say, that the thing is necessary, because it is impossible. To make this plain to my plainest Reader, I will shew the legality of my deduction by these degrees. First, he that is wrought upon by God (to believe, obey, or persevere irresistibly,) cannot possibly do otherwise (than believe, obey, or persevere.) Secondly, he that cannot possibly do otherwise than he doth, cannot possibly *chuse but do what he doth*. Thirdly, he that cannot *chuse but do what he doth*, doth clearly do it whether he will or no. Fourthly, he that doth believe, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by a evident undeniable Necessity, as that by which a stone tends downward, (which tendency of the stone, though it is spontaneous, yet it is not voluntary; and as it is not by violence, so it is not by choice neither.) Fifthly, he that willeth to believe, obey, or persevere, whether he will or no, doth do it by a Necessity, by which a stone tends upwards when it is thrown: (Which tendency of the stone is so farre from voluntary, that it is not spontaneous; it is not only an irrational, but an unnatural thing; and besides implies a contradiction in a voluntary Agent, which cannot take place in an involuntary stone.) For to say a man willeth to obey or believe, whether he will or no, is to say, he willeth it either without his will, or against his will, or else not having a will at all; which is as bad as to say, that he must needs will it, because he cannot any way possible. I know not any trick imaginable to escape the odium of these Absurdities, unlesse by denying the definition of irresistible; which were not to escape, but to commute absurdities: and not only the authority of Doctor Twisse, but the very force of the word would cry it down. And so little is my deduction in a capacity to be blamed, that Doctor Twisse saith expressly of irresistibility, it hath no place in the act of willing. And though he pleadeth for a

In actu volendi locum non habet. In loco Ne-citatio.

Ex huiusmodi
autem operati-
one divina ex-
istit Necessitas
effectus, cum
ipsa libertate
voluntatis con-
sent. en. Ibid.

Necessity which he will have to follow Gods operation upon the Soul; yet he will have that Necessity to be no other, than what may very well agree with the liberty of the will. So that if that Doctor, in that his skirmish with Arminius, had not confounded a necessity with a certainty of event, and used that word in stead of this, his Antagonist and He (in that particular) must needs have wrangled into Friendship. For Arminius denieth the irresistible working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth Dr. Twisse. Again Dr. Twisse affirmeth, that the liberty of the Will doth agree with the working of Grace upon the Will, and so doth Arminius. And therefore I hope for no hard usage from such as are haters of Arminius, whilst I say the same things with them that hate him.

The grounds of
the opposite mis-
take removed,

47. Methinks the principal Ground of my mistakes heretofore in this business (if I may be allowed to passe a conjecture upon my self) is the misapprehension of certain Texts; the cause of whose misapprehension is the illogical confounding of two things, which, though they look like one another, yet are exceedingly different. E. G. from [Ezek. 29. 27. Cant. 1. 14. 1 Ioh. 3. 9. "I will cause you to walk in my Statutes, &c. Draw me, we will run after thee. Whosoever is born of God cannot sin, because he is born of God, and the like] many conclude that Gods working upon the wills of his Elect, is by such a physical immediate immutation of their wills, as doth not only produce a certain, but a necessary effect: and being forgetful (rather than ignorant) to distinguish necessity from certainty of events, they call that necessary which is but certain and infallible, and so (through haste or inadvertency) they swallow down the Errour of irresistible Grace; using the word irresistible in stead of efficacious. And this is a second inadvertency begotten of the first; as commonly one error loves to draw on another. Now because a fallacy undiscerned in the premisses cannot possibly be discover'd by gazing only on the Conclusion (just as an error in the first Concoction is hardly mended in the second;) I must mark out the difference betwixt infallible and necessary, before I can usefully distinguish betwixt effectual and irresistible.

By rightly di-
stinguishing be-
twixt infallible
and necessary.

48. Infallible properly is that that cannot erre, or be deceived: That is properly necessary, which cannot but be. The first relates

lates to the perfection of the Knowledge of God, but the second to the *Almightinesse* of his will. The first is properly applyed unto the object of God's *fore-sight*, (and though 'tis otherwise used, yet 'tis by such a *Catachresis*, as I humbly conceive to be a *stone of stumbling*;) but the second more precisely unto the object of his *Decree*. The first is consistent with those *contingent events*, to which the second is *diametrically opposed*. E. G. That I am now writing is but *contingent*, because I do it upon *choice*: yet God's *foreknowledge* of this my writing from all *Eternity* did infer that this my writing would *infallibly come to passe*. This event is *contingent*, for I can *chuse*; but yet *infallible*, for God cannot *erre*. This *contingent* therefore doth *infallibly come to passe*, not by way of a *consequent*, but by way of *consequence*. My writing being not the *effect*, but the *object* only of God's *Omniscience*; which is, in order, *before the Act*. God *foresees* a *contingent will contingently come to passe*, and therefore we infer it will *infallibly come to passe*, because he *foresees* it who is *infallible*. So that his *prescience* is a *consequent* of the things coming to passe; and its *infallibility* of coming to passe is *inferred* from his *prescience* only by way of *consequence*. It is one thing, to *follow* as the *effect* of a *Cause*, in order of *Nature*; and quite another, to *follow* as the *sequel* of an *Antecedent*, in way of *Argumentation*. The short and plain upshot of all is this: The precious vessels of *Election* do very certainly and *infallibly persevere* unto the end, and that by reason of Gods *omniscience* which cannot be *deceived*; but not of *necessity* and *irresistibly*, by reason of his *omnipotence* which cannot be *frustrate* nor *defeated*. What God *foresees* shall come to passe, shall *infallibly come to passe*, and that because he cannot *erre* who is *omniscient*. (On the other side) what God *decrees* shall come to passe, *must* come to passe of *necessity*, because he cannot be *resisted* who is *omnipotent*.

49. Hence it is easie to *distinguish* betwixt the other two things, which have been so often & so unhappily confounded; I mean *sufficient*, *effectual*, and *irresistible*, applied to *Grace*.
 1. *Sufficient Grace* is that, which possibly may produce that effect for which it is given. 2. *Effectual* is that, which certainly will. 3. *Irresistible* is that, which necessarily must. That which is

betwixt sufficient, effectual, and irresistible.

Action in general, Volition in particular. Chap. 4.

irresistible doth carry away its object to what it pleaseth, like a mighty Torrent, by indisputable force, maugre the greatest opposition that can be made; and therefore cannot take place in the elections of the will, which ceaseth to elect after the nature of a will, in case it be made to do any thing whether it will or no, (as hath already been shew'd from no lesse a concession than that of Doctor Twisse:) but that which is only effectual is quite another thing, and doth prevail upon the will not ineluctably, but infallibly. It doth so strongly and effectually incline the will, at such critical opportunities, and by such congruous means, as that the will doth very certainly and undoubtedly assent: but it doth not so irresistibly and compulsively necessitate, as to take away the freedome and possibility of assenting, by making it do what it doth, even whether it will or no.

Between action in general, and volition in particular. Between taking and chusing.

50. I discern the truth of this distinction with greater ease, by having alwaies in my prospect the very great difference betwixt the generical notion of acting or taking, and the specific notion of willing or chusing. God indeed (if it please him) can by his absolute power over his Creature, make him do this thing, or take that thing, by ineluctable Necessity, and whether he will or no: but then that acting is not volition, and that taking is not choice: for the very word choice cannot be apprehended, but it must carry along with it a sound of freedome. Optio must be *optimorum*, and so *duorum* at least. It is of two things, or more, that we chuse the best, whether in reality or in appearance. And this liberty of the will by which we chuse, being acknowledged on all sides, (as well by Mr. Perkins and Dr. Twisse, as by Bellarmine and Arminius, as every man knows that hath but read and compar'd them) that famous *supra* of a twofold Necessity, the one of coaction, and the other of infallibility, (being built upon a manifest and grosse mistake, both of the word Necessity, and the word Infallibility,) seems to me to be serviceable to no other end, than to cover a wound, which 'tis impossible to cure. But admit of that distinction of a twofold Necessity, or admit a Necessity be twentyfold, yet still it ceaseth not to have the nature of a Necessity. If it is absolutely necessary that I must go to London, it doth not

not cease to be *Necessity*, because I am *drawn*, rather than *driven*. *Coaction* and *infallibility*, if they do both imply an *absolute* and *peremptory necessity* (and so by consequence an *irresistibility*, and so by consequence are *opposed* to the *elective* faculty of the *Will*,) it is no matter how they differ in their *syllables* and their *sounds*. Shall I declare my judgement then, (although in *weakness*, yet in *sincerity*) how *free-will* is *necessary* to the *chusing* of good, to which, *without Grace*, it is altogether *insufficient*? My judgement is, that it is *necessary*, not as a *Cause*, but as a *Condition*: not as that, by *virtue* of which we can do any thing that is good; but as that, *without which* we cannot *chuse* it. God's *Grace* alone is the *cause* of the good, but *man's will* is as really the *instrument* of the *choice*. We can do good, as God's *Engines*, *without a will*; and so did *Balaams Ass* without a *Reason*: but we cannot *chuse* good, without a *free-will*; as that *Ass* could not possibly *understand* what the *spake*, *without a Ratiocination*. This seems to me to be as *plain* as the *light*. And now I speak of the *light*, (if my *Reader* please) by that *light* I will make it *plain*. We know the *Sun* is the *fountain* or *cause* of *light*; and *light* the *onely means* by which we *see*. But yet the *opening* of the *Eye-lid* is a *necessary condition*; because if I *wink*, I am *dark* at *noon*. And if my *Eye-lid* is *held open* by such a *power* as I cannot *resist*, my *Eye* in that case cannot *chuse* but *see*, and therefore cannot *chuse* to *see*. My sight may be with *delectation*, but not properly with that which is call'd *election*. Thus if a man be never so much *delighted* in doing good, but (by reason of *necessity*) cannot possibly *but do it*, it is God that *chuseth* that good, and the man doth *onely* *act* it. I say, God *chuseth*, by a *cataphorical* way of speaking, meerly the better to *shew* my *thoughts*. For though God did *chuse* to *make* a world, and one world, because it was in his power to have made *many worlds*, or *none at all*; yet I conceive it *absurd*, to say that God did *chuse* to be good, or that he *chuseth* to do good, (in opposition to evil) because he is good, and doth good by an *absolute necessity*; he cannot *chuse* to be, or to do, any otherwise. And so he *loves*, but doth not *chuse* it. For if that were *true speaking*, it would be a *true speaking* to say, That God doth will his
being

Voluntary and Spontaneous. Chap. 4.

being and doing good whether he will or no; or that he cannot chuse but chuse: which is sure very childish untoward speaking. Onely he chuseth to enable us to do it, because he can chuse whether he will so enable us, or not. When he giveth us his Grace, he hath the power to withhold it; when he continueth his Grace, he hath the power to withdraw it: therefore doth he chuse both to give and to continue it. The goodnesse of his essence is not arbitrary and elective, but spontaneous and natural: whereas the goodnesse of his effects in all his Creatures is not naturally necessary in respect of him, but arbitrary and elective, meerly depending upon his choice and pleasure; for he gave us our goodnesse when he would, and may take it away when he pleaseth. To understand this the better, and to hold it the faster in my understanding,

Betwixt voluntary and spontaneous.

§ 1. I must carefully distinguish betwixt *spontaneum* (that which is of its own accord) and *voluntarium*, (that which is freely and upon choice.) The first is agreeable to inanimate creatures, the second only to rational. That is properly oppos'd to violence, but reconcilable with necessity, to which this is oppos'd. E. G. A stone tends downwards by a natural, and necessary, and spontaneous motion. It tends downwards of necessity, because it cannot but do so: and yet spontaneously, because it doth it without violence, and of its own accord. But yet that motion is not voluntary, nor doth the stone chuse that kind of tendency, because it could not refuse it, as not being furnisht with the liberty of a will. Thus when I made my entrance out of the womb into the world, I did not chuse to go forwards, because I had not the power to stay behind; I did it as a spontaneous, not as a voluntary Agent. But now that I am capable either of virtue, or of vice, and do pursue the one, in refusal of the other, I do it not onely in a spontaneous, but in a voluntary manner. We have the perfect character of a voluntary Agent in that admirable *ναυαγοστος* of the Son of Syrach.

Ecclesiasticus 15, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

“ The Lord left man in the hand of his counsel; if thou wilt, to keep the Commandements. He hath set fire and water before thee: stretch forth thy hand unto whether thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be given him. I dare not (like *Marcion*) be more inquisitive, why God made man with such a freedome of

SECT. 52. Two Examples of Grace resisted.

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of willing or nilling, then why he made the hand with those two Muscles, whereof the one doth move to the taking of a thing, and the other, to the throwing of it away.

52. Having spoken all this in order to the clearing of resistibility of the working of Grace in God's Elect, I think I cannot do better than to apply my reasoning to two Examples (at least as much of it as shall be needful;) whereof one must be the *Protoplast* before his Fall, and the other must be one of his posterity, whom we are very well assured to have been one of God's Elect. Adam was made in a state of Innocence, and (God not requiring any impossibilities, as brick without straw) had grace enough to have performed a most adequate obedience to God's Command. Which if he had not resisted, how could he have sinn'd? And if that measure of Grace was less'n'd before he sinn'd, how was the taking away of Grace any punishment of his Fall? Or, how was he then in the state of Innocence? If he was not, then was he sinful before he sinn'd. God doth not take away his Grace, unlesse to punish the abuse of it. But Adam did not abuse it before he sinn'd. And by our Saviours Rule [To him that hath shall be given] God would rather have given him more, than have taken away any. From whence it follows, that though the working of Grace in the heart of Adam was so strong and so perfect, as to enable him to stand, and that in no less than a state of Innocence; yet was it also so resistible, as to suffer him to fall, and that into no less than a state of perdition. And although he had the favour to be rais'd again in some measure, yet it was not to that Innocence from whence he fell. So that as to his first Covenant, and his first pitch of perfection, his Fall was not only total, but final too. And indeed I would know, why our Saviour hath told us, that "from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath, if it is not for this reason, because he hath lavisht out his talent, and hath resisted that power of doing well which was offer'd him. Sure there is no better arguing than *ab actu ad potentiam*. Man can resist, because he doth. And I may wonder, as well as Grotius, why such men are not confuted by their own experience, who say that Grace in the Elect is irresistible, unlesse they will deny themselves to be of the number of the Elect. David had

A result of the whole in two Examples.

Mat. 25. 28.

Grace to have done better than he did in the double matter of *Uriah*, but he resisted it with a witness, and that for some months together. He was a vessel of election; how then did he resist the Grace of God, so as to fall into those damnable and killing sins, in which if he had been snatcht away, he had perished irreversibly? It was not without grace, (for he was one of the Elect;) nor by its concurrence, (for God was not guilty:) it was therefore against the working and means of Grace. Indeed if God did his utmost, such as David could never sin: Or if they could, it would argue God to be conquer'd either by man, or Devil. Unless we should say, that such omnipotent grace doth come, and go, and come again, after the measure that God is willing a man should sin, and repent, and sin again. And therefore it is evident, that God Almighty, in his Elect, doth shew the congruous, efficacious power, but not the irresistibility and Almightyesse of his Grace. Sure David and Solomon did fall from Grace, by resisting it, in both acceptions of the word Grace, (as it is taken for gracious living, and as it is taken for the favour of God;) and this invincibly conclusible even from that very answer which is wont to be alledged for irresistibility. For they say that God had decreed the Repentance and return of David, and that therefore he could not die, until he had repented. Which is spoken by them for this reason, because if David had not repented, he must have perished: which yet he could not have done, if he had continued in the state of Grace.

And that
cleared from
an exception.

53. If against this it is excepted, That though a vessel of Election may fall damnably from Grace, yet he cannot finally; this is unworthy for a Scholar to speak or hear: for whoever was so silly as to say or think, that the precious vessels of Election can fall away finally? this is not answering the argument, but forsaking the Question. The Question is, whether the Grace of God doth work irresistibly in the Elect? not whether or no it brings them to a most certain and infallible degree of blisse? (For they that dispute against the first, affirm the second.) Grace is proved to be resistible in Gods Elect by such examples as David. And to that it is answer'd, he could not so resist as to fall away finally. Which is first a skipping from the first Question to the second, and secondly, it is to say (what no man living doth gainsay) that such as persevere unto the end
can

can never fall away finally. A grosse identical proposition, which doth not onely betray the weaknesse of that opinion which it asserteth, but doth establish the truth of this very Cause which I am pleading. For it confesseth, that Grace is resistible, and onely denies that it is finally resisted. David was able to resist it, but he did not resist it unto the end. And every technical Grammarian can distinguish the Act which is implied in the Participle, from the A^pritude which is couched in the Adjective in *bitis*. But (to hasten towards the conclusion of my Readers sufferings) there is also a final as well as total resisting of such a Grace as is sufficient for the attainment of Glory. For (not to speak of those men who resisted and sinned against all the means that could be used, Isa. 5. 4. and who alwayes resisted the Holy Ghost, Acts 7. 51. and who would not be gathered, after never so many essayes, Mat. 23. 37.) how many Christian professors are now in Hell, who when they were Infants were fit and suitable for Heaven? "Shall not I spare Nineveh, in which are above 120000. "souls, which cannot distinguish betwixt the right hand and "the left? Ionah 4. 11. God speaks there of Heathen Infants, towards whom his Bowels did yearn within him, and that upon the impendence of but a temporal destruction. But I speak here of Infants born and baptized into a membership of the Church. How many are there of such, who in their harmlesse Non-age were babes of Grace, and yet have out-lived their Innocence, so as at last to be transformed into vessels of wrath? I will shut up this Paragraph with the words of Tertullian

* "Saul was turned into a Prophet by the Spirit of holiness, "as well as into an Apostate by the spirit of uncleanness. And "the Devil entred into Judas, who for some time together had "been deputed with the Elect. And with the saying of St. Au- "gustine, That "if the regenerate and justified shall fall away "into a wicked course of living by his own will and pleasure, "he cannot say, I have not received, because he hath wilfully "lost that Grace of God which he had received, by that will "of his which was at liberty to sin. And how exactly that

* Saulum iam
Dei Spiritus
veritate Pra-
phetam quam
malis spiritus
postea Apo-
statum. Iudas
aliquandiu
cum electis de-
putatus postea
diabolus. inter-

vit. Tert. de anima c. 1.

† Si regeneratus & iustificatus in malum voluntate relabatur, certo is non potest dicere, Non accipi, quia accepimus gratiam Dei. Superius malum arbitrio libero amisit. Aug. de Grat. & Corr. c. 6. & c. 9.

Father doth speak my sense of this businesse, I leave it for any one to judge who shall consult him *De prad. Sanct. l. 1. c. 14. De bono Persev. l. 2. c. 1, & 6. & l. 2. c. 8, & 13.* And I would very fain know, whether the *lost Goat*, the *lost Sheep*, and the *prodigal Son*, do not signifie (in our Saviours Parables) that a true believer may be *lost*, and being *lost* may be *found*, and again become a true believer. Which is as much as I desire to prove the thing under consideration.

CHAP. V.

54.

The Decree of Election conditional and respective.

Qua gratia non nova voluntas creatur, neque invita voluntas cogitur, sed infirma sanatur, depravata corrigitur, & ex mala in bonum convertitur, ac interiore quodam modo trahitur, ut ex nolente volens efficiatur, & Divine vocati- onis libenter consentiat, &c. August. de grat. & lib. arb. ad Valent. cap. 13.

HAVING evinced to my self (and that is all that I pretend to) first, that my will of it self is inclinable to evil; and that, secondly, of it self it is not inclinable to good; and that, thirdly, it is inclined by the singular and special operation of Grace, to the refusing of evil, and to the chusing of good; and that therefore, in the fourth place, that singular Grace doth not work so irresistibly as to compel an unwilling will, but yet so strongly, as to heal a sick one; not so necessitating the will of God's Elect, as that inevitably it must, but yet so powerfully perswading, as that it certainly will, both believe and obey, and after repentance persevere unto the end: I should in civility to my Reader conclude this Trouble, if I were sure that some men would not call it *Tergiversation*; and if I were not obliged by those Papers, which have been so frequently, so falsely, (that I may not say maliciously) transcribed, and are threatened to be laid very publicly to my charge, (and which I plead in the defence of this mine own publication, which I should never have chosen upon such a subject, as I have least of all studied, and am least delighted in of any other) to remonstrate the utmost of what I think in these matters. For I do stedfastly believe (what I also asserted in that extemporary Discourse, which was the innocent cause of this unacceptable effect.) That Gods Decree of Election

Sicut prascit, praedestinat, & propterea praedestinat, qui quale futurum sit prascit. Mala tantum prascit, & non praedestinat. Aug. in Resp. ad calum. Pelag. sub initium l. 6. Mypognosticon.

from

Sect. 55, 56. and respect of our being in Christ.

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from all eternity, was not *absolute and irrelative*, but in *respect unto*, and in *prescience* of some qualification, without which no man is the proper object of such Decree. And this I prove to my self from these wayes of Reasoning.

55. First, I consider with my self, that there is no *salvation* but onely to *such* as are found to be in *Christ Iesus*, in the day of *Death* and of *Judgement*. Which no man living can be, unlesse he be qualified with such *conditions*, as without which it is impossible to be so found (such as are *Faith*, and *Obedience*, and *Repentance*, after sin, bringing forth such fruits as are worthy of *Repentance*, and *perseverance in well-doing unto the end*.) That God will save none but *such*, is all mens *Confession*. And that he saves none but *such* whom he decrees to save, is every whit as plain. Therefore none but *such* are the object of such Decree. For if he decreed to save any without regard or respect to their being *such*, he might actually save them without regard or respect to their being *such*. Because whatsoever is justly decreed, may be justly executed as it is decreed. But it is granted on all sides (as I suppose) that God will save none except *such* as are found to be in *Christ* with the *aforesaid qualifications*; and therefore it should be agreed on all sides, that he decreed to save none but *such as they*. And what is that but a *respective and conditional Decree*, made in intuition of our being in *Christ*, and of our being so qualified to be in *Christ*? So that although our election is not of works, but of him that calleth; yet good works are required as a necessary condition, though utterly unworthy to be a cause of our election. Nor can it be without respect to the condition of the Covenant, that the Covenant is made, and the promise decreed to be fulfilled.

56. Secondly, I consider, that the Decree of the Father to send the Son to be a second Adam, was in respect and regard to the back-sliding of the first Adam. Without which it was impossible that the Son of God should have been sent to be the Saviour of the world. And the decree of God Almighty to save the first Adam, was in regard of and respect to the meritoriousness of the second Adam. For God adopteth never a child, nor doth acknowledge him for his own, so as to give him eternal life, unless it be for the sake of his only-begotten Son. First, God

Proved by reason from its being respective of our being in Christ, and of the conditions by which we are so.

Eph. 1. 4, 6.
Rom. 8. 39.
2 Cor. 5. 15.

pitied a woful world, then he loved what he pitied, next he gave his own Son to save what he loved; and upon the condition of believing in his Son, he gave it a promise of eternal life. For so believing is interposed betwixt love and life, in the 3. of S. Iohn verſe 26. God ſo loved the world, that he gave his onely begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him, ſhould not periſh, but have everlaſting life. From this Text it appeareth, that God loved the world before he gave his Son to it; for therefore gave he his Son, becauſe he loved it. But it was not a love by which he loved it to life everlaſting; for with ſuch love he onely loved it in his Son; and the world is not capable of ſuch a love without the condition of believing. It was therefore in preſcience of our believing in Chriſt, that God elected us to life eternal. For Chriſt is not only the means, (as ſome affirm) but the meritorious cauſe, and the Head of our Election. Chriſt was foreknown, 1 Pet. 1. 2. and we in him, Rom. 8. 29. Chriſt was predeſtin'd, and we by him, Ephes. 1. 5.

And from the nature of Election.

Ἐπὶ τὴν κατὰ
λογὴν, ἔδει-
ξεν ὅτι καὶ δι-
φασιν ἀλλήλων
ἡ δὲ ἐκείνη δὲ ὁ-
λόγηται ἵνα περὶ
αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀλλοίων.

Oecum. apud
Epiſc. vint. de
Artic. Lamb.
Jud.

57. Thirdly, I conſider, that there muſt be a difference before there can be an election. Love indeed is an act of favour, but election is properly an act of judgement; a preferring of the better before the worſe. They that ſay God elected ſuch a number of men without the leaſt intuition of their qualifications by which they are differenced from the reprobated crew, do ſpeak illogically (to ſay no worſe.) How much ſafer is it to ſay, that becauſe ſuch men as are in Chriſt by Faith, are better than ſuch as are out of Chriſt by Infidelity, therefore thoſe are taken, and theſe are left? Nor doth this derogate from God, or arrogate to man, to ſay, he chuſeth his own gifts, any more than it doth to ſay, he crowns them. For God doth give us the advantage of our being in Chriſt, as well as chuſe us for that advantage. Firſt he giveth us his Son, next he giveth us his Grace whereby to enable us to believe in his Son, and ſo believing he doth elect us. So that here is no matter for man to boaſt on; he having nothing which he hath not received, no not ſo much as his ἀντιχρῆστον. It is God that makes the difference, as well as God that chuſeth. And it ſeems this very argument from the nature and uſe of the word Election, did prevail with S. Auſtin and Oecumenius.

St. Au-

Sect. 58. by Reason, Scripture and Antiquity. 71

St. *Austin* saith expressly, that *Iustification* precedeth *Electi-*
on; and his reason is, because no man is elected unlesse he dis-
 fer from him that is rejected.

Non tamen E-
lectio precedit
Iustificationem,
sed Electionem

Iustificatio. Nemo enim eligitur, nisi jam distans ab illo qui rejectur. Unde quod
 dictum est, Quia elegit nos Deus ante mundi constitutionem, non video quomodo sit dicen-
 dum nisi presentia. *August. ad Simpl. 1. 2.*

58. Fourthly, I consider that the whole Tenor of the Scrip-
 tures, in the Iudgement of all the Fathers, who are best
 able to understand them, teacheth no other predestination,
 than in and through Christ, which is respectiue and con-
 ditional. First the Scripture gives us none but conditional
 promises; such as, "If any man keep my saying, he
 shall never taste Death. Whatsoever a man soweth
 that shall he reap. And, we shall reap if we faint not.
 "If any man will hear my voice, and open the doore, I
 will come in to him, &c. Nay even the very Texts
 which are wont to be urged for irrelative Election do
 seem very precisely to evince the contrary. For when God
 is said to predestine according to his good pleasure which he
 had purposed in himself; the word *iustus*, rendred good
 pleasure, doth not signifie the absolutenesse, but the re-
 spectivenesse of his will: for it relateth to something in
 which God is well pleased, and that is Christ. It being
 impossible for God to please himself with mankind, or
 for men to be acceptable and well pleasing to God, any
 otherwise than in him, of whom it was said, "This is
 my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased. Besides, all
 those Scriptures which doe teach universal Grace, and Re-
 demption, (which I suppose hath been proved in the prose-
 cution of my first principle) doe seem to me most clearly
 to inferre a respectiue and conditional Election. For if it
 is true, that Christ did offer up himself, not only suffici-
 ently, but intentionally, for all; if he did earnestly desire, that
 every one would come in upon the preaching of his Word,
 and receive the benefit of his Death and Passion; if his
 warnings were not in jest, and his invitations serious; if
 [depart from me ye cursed] was therefore foretold, that
 every one might beware and not obtrude himself upon
 that sentence; if he is unwilling that any one should be
 caught;

Proved by
Scripture.

Job. 8. 51.

Gal. 6. 7, 9.

Rev. 3. 20.

Eph. 1. 9.

Aug in S. v. m.
28. de Sanct.
Idem contra
3 epist. Pelag.
l. 3. c. 2.
Idem de sp. &
lit. ad Mar-
cell. c. 33.

caught in the Serpents snare, who shews to all (without exception) a certain way to escape; if (as St. Austin speaks) he is desirous not to strike, who bids us look to our posture, and stand upon our guard; if (as St. Austin speaks again) he shews his power to punish none but onely those that refuse his Mercy, and would not damn any one without respect to sin, who gave his own Son to die for all: then his refusing of the Goats in respect of that which makes them differ from Sheep, infers his Election of the Sheep in respect of that which makes them differ from Goats. And I have made the more haste to make this Inference, because as the respectivenesse of Election needs not otherwise to be proved than by the respectivenesse of Reprobation; so they are both taken for granted, upon the supposition of Christ's having dyed, not onely sufficiently, but intentionally, for all. Towards which (having discoursed so largely of it already) I will onely offer this one consideration, which meets my pen as I am writing, and even obtrudes it self upon me to be delivered. It is briefly this: That since our Saviour upon the Crosse did very heartily pray, even for those very homicides, and parricides, and Deicides that kill'd him, we have no reason but to believe, that he laid down his life even for them that took it away; and that he died for all for whom he prayed. And yet we reading of their Murders, but not of their Repentance, I should be loth to tell my people, that those crucifying wretches were precious vessels of Election, (in compliance with that opinion, that Christ died only for the Elect) lest they should comfort up themselves in the most crimson sins that can be named (like some in the world) as well consisting with their pretensions to the Kingdome of Heaven. And yet, in my shallow judgement, (which because it is shallow, I do submit to those of deeper and profounder reach, how dogmatically soever I may seem to have spoken in many places of this Discourse) I say, in my shallow judgement, Christ dyed for all for whom he prayed; and he prayed for them that curs'd themselves. His blood be upon us (said they;) and yet (said he) Father, forgive them. He made his Murderers Execration become his Prayer. He took the poyson out of their

their Curse, and made it wholesome for them. He wished, as well as they, that his blood might be both upon them and upon their children; but in his own most mercifull, not in their barbarous and cruel sense: for they meant the guilt, He the benefit of his blood; and would have it light on them, not to accuse, but cleanse them. And yet I dare not affirm, that they were all a portion of God's Elect.

59. Lastly, I consider, that the main stream of the Fathers doth run this way. And not to trouble my Reader with such a Catalogue of particulars, as I gave in before, for a Conditional reprobation, (which yet I think were very easie upon a very small warning) I will content my self at present to prove what I say from the confessions of Beza, and Doctor Twisse. First Beza in his Comment upon Rom. 11. 2. rejects the Iudgement of the Fathers, because they are not (as he would have them) for the absolute, irrelative, unconditional way. And Dr. Twisse confesseth, that all the Ancients, before St. Austin, did place the object of God's Election in Fide praevisa. At which St. Austin was so far from being any way displeased, as that (with very great reverence to their Authority) he made it appear to be an innocent and harmlesse Tenent. He affirmed that all the Fathers, who lived before himself, agreed in this, That the Grace of God is not prevented by humane merits. Which one profession he thought sufficient for the asserting of the free Grace of the Divine predestination. To which saying of St. Austin, because I find that Dr. Twisse doth very readily subscribe, I ought in reason to be secured from any very hard censure, because I am not an affirmer of humane merits, much lesse do I place them in a precedency to Grace.

60. I conclude with a desire of so much liberty of conscience, as to believe with St. Paul, That God is a respecter not of * Persons, but of * Works. That my sins are perfectly and entirely mine own. And that if I do any thing that is good, it is not I that do it, but the (a) Grace of God that is in me. Yet so, as that I can (b) do all things through him that strengthens me. And who doth so strengthen, as that I may do them, but

And by Antiquity, from the concessions of Anti-remonstrants.

Patres hic nullo modo audiendi, qui ad praevisionem hoc referunt. Beza in Rom. 11. 2. edit. 2. Twiss. in Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 8. sect. 4. p. 110. August. de bono persever. c. 19. & 20. Twiss. loco citato.

The Conclusion.

* Rom. 2. 11.
* verse 14.

a 1 Cor. 15. 10.

b Philip. 4. 13.

but not so force me as that I *must*. In this, and every other thing, I have been long since taught by *Vincentius Lirinensis*, (whom I shall ever observe to the utmost of my discretion) to opine with the most, and most judicious, rather than with the fewest, and least discerning. *Opinia streta* is a fault, but *Fallibility* is none. If my Teachers are in the right, they have knowledge enough to make me moderately instructed: if they are any where in the wrong, they have authority enough to make me pardonably erroneous: if I have not perspicacity to comprehend them as they deserve, it seems they have Depths enough to prove, I am *Invincibly ignorant*.

The End.



A Post-script.

* I mean the things that are personal only, by way of Remonstrance or Apologie, and not exactly material to the Questions under Debate.

HAVING been many times desired, and at last prevailed with, to permit these Notes a second time unto the Presse, I somewhat more than intended (for I had made some preparations, as well by adding many things, as by omitting some few) to have improved and advanced them into the dignity of a Volume, to which in justice, as well as modesty, they have not hitherto pretended. But I was prompted by second thoughts, to which I commonly submit my first, onely to add such running Titles over the heads of the Pages, with such notifications of the chapters and sections relating to them, as seemed to be of advantage to common Readers: neither enlarging nor diminishing the things themselves, but taking care to have them printed, not onely page for page, but line for line as they were before. And to this course I was led by two reasons more especially. First, that no correptory Corruptor might have any pretence for new Inventions; and not onely no cause, but no occasion to accuse me of Tergiversation. Next, that the Reader might discern, with his greatest ease, in what an incomparable manner both my words and pages had been misquoted by my Corruptor, in his Aspersions, and how truly cited by me, in my Defence.

Who-

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Whosoever shall have the patience to view the *Structure* here laid, and those *unquestionable Pillars* on which it lies, or shall be at the pains to compare the *Rivulets* with those * *two Fountains* from whence they stream, He will think it more than strange, that any man should be transported with such *exorbitancies of passion*, as to load me with dirt, for no other reason, than that he hated to see me clean; that so much money, and sweat, and time, and conscience, should be so lavishly laid out in such impure and cheap stuffe, as "Pelagian, Socinian, Jesuitical, Atheistical, Dragon, Devil, Impudent, Diabolical, Satanical Blasphemer, and a world of merchandize besides, fetcht from the same place of Traffick; and all for no other cause or provocation, than my clearing God's Will, and laying blame upon mine own.

* p. 6.

This kind of usage puts me in mind of what was said by King James in that Preface which he made to his *Basilicon Doron*. * "If the charitable Reader will advisedly consider,

* Bas. Dop. in Pref. ad lect. p. 6, 7.

"both the method and matter of my Treatise, he will easily judge what wrong I have sustained by the carping at both.

"--I would have thought my sincere plainness in the first part, should have dated the mouth of the most envious Momus,

"that ever hell did hatch (they are the Kings own words,) from

"barking at any other part of my Book upon that Ground;

"except they would alledge me to be contrary to my self, which

"in so small a Volume would smell of too great weakness &

"slipperiness of memory. ---* Some fraughted with causelesse

* Ibid. p. 16.

"envy at the Author, did greedily search out the Book, think-

"ing their stomach fit enough, for turning never so wholesome

"food into noisome and infective humors.---which hath in-

"forced the untimous divulging of this Book, far contrary to

"my intentions, as I have already said.---* Well, leaving these

* p. 10.

"new Baptizers and Blockers of others mens Books, to their

"own Follies, I return to my purpose. This again puts me in

mind of what was said by another King, to whom King James

was but a Subject. * "† If they have called the Master of the

† Mat. 10. 24, 25.

"house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of

"his household? The Disciple is not above his Master, nor the

"servant above his Lord: it is enough for the Disciple that he

"be as his Master, and the servant as his Lord. So that I have no

reason to afflict my self with any Calumnies already past, or to

A Post-script.

flatter my self with any hopes, that I shall be able to prevent them for the time to come; for when the children of Men are set upon it to be injurious, neither the *Serpent* nor the *Dove*, nor both together, can escape them. Had there been place of evasion either for innocence, or circumspection (innocence giving no cause, and circumspection cutting off occasions) sure *John the Baptist* had not been slander'd, much less our Saviour: Yet were they (each of them) slander'd, not onely upon divers, but upon contrary pretences. *John* came unto the world neither eating nor drinking, and they said, He had a (a) Devil. Our Saviour came both eating and drinking, and they said, Behold a man (b) gluttonous and a wine-bibber. Now because it is evident, that let a mans conversation be what it can be, he must eat, or not eat, drink, or not drink, no man therefore hath an exemption from being smitten with the Tongue. For if he is seen either eating or drinking, he is liable to be called either a Glutton, or a Drunkard, because Gluttons and Drunkards do eat and drink. And if he is seen neither eating nor drinking, he is apt to be reported to have a Devil, because a Devil doth neither eat nor drink. From all which I gather, That the disease of evil and false-speaking (which a late Author in two words hath called *Correptory Correction*) is sooner cured by a mans carelesnesse, than prevented by his care. For some are able to create as well the matter, as the form of their Inventions; and if we will not be so liberal, as to * give them occasion, they will then be so bold, as to take occasion without our leave.

a Mat. 11. 18.
b verse 19.
* 1 Tim. 5. 14

What I speak on this Theme, is not only in relation to those unparallell'd Inventions already publicly discovered, but in relation to some which have happen'd since; which if they had not since happen'd, I had not made the least reflection upon that which was sufficiently made known before. There is (it seems by the effect) a generation of men, who when they cannot hurt publicly by force of Argument, or dint of Pen, they love to try a more secret and private way, saying within themselves, (as once they did of *Jeremiah*) (c) Come let us devise devises against him; come and let us smite him with the tongue. There are certain Rumourers, whose Trade in English is expressed by *Whisperers* and *Tale-bearers*, who having (d) learnt to be idle (as the Apostle speaks

e Jer. 18. 18.
d par. Salomon
1 Tim. 5. 13

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speaks of some young widows) and being perfect in that kinde of learning, go wandering about from house to house: nor is that the worst of them; for they are not (e) onely idle (as the Apostle goes on) but Tatlers also and Busie-Bodies, speaking things which they ought not. They advise the people, in effect, not to use their own eyes; or if they do, not to trust them; not to give up their assent to what they know; nor to confide in their experience: but to believe what they are told, or to tell it as freely as if they were able to believe it; and to do it the more demurely by how much there is the greater need, as being quite against the verdicts of sense and reason. This brings into my memory the words of Prosper, (f) *Quod in aperto clamare jam metuunt, in secreto seminare non quiescunt*: and that other saying of Cicero, *Sordidum genus hominum, qui parum proficiunt, nisi admodum mentiantur*,

Now because there are those who put their * Trust in their Inventions, and (g) teach their Tongues to speak lies, and make Forgeries (h) their refuge; I think it a duty to my self, who have been (i) slanderously reported of in several kindes, & a duty which I owe both to the Reader in general, and to the credulous receivers of such reports, at least to declare as S. Paul did, that such reports are slanderous. S. Paul complained that He was slanderously reported of, in being affirmed to have said, * Let us do evil that good may come: for which report notwithstanding there was not any just cause, yet at least there was some little colour; because the Apostle had said, That the (k) unrighteousness of men commendeth the righteousness of God, and that the truth of God through mens (l) lies might the more redound unto his glory. Upon occasion of which words, either not really understood, or else industriously mistaken, he was reported by his enemies to have said another thing, viz. That evil might be done in order to a good end: which was so far from having been said by the Apostle, that he declared it a slander, and farther pronounced of the reporters, that their (m) damnation was just. This was said of those men who had some colour for their Inventions. But there is not any the least colour for my being reported to be a Jesuite, or a denyer of original sin, or a Socinian, or a Pelagian, or the Author of Books which I never read,

εἰ μὴ οὖν δὲ
ἀργαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ
φλύαροι καὶ
ωφέλειοι,
ὅτι ἰβιδ.

f Prosper contra
Cillat. cap. 41.
p. 413. ex Au-
gust. Epist. ad
Sixtum 105.
Isa. 59. 4.
Jer. 7. 8.
g Jer. 9. 5.
h Isai. 28. 15.
i Rom. 3. 8.

* Ibid.

k verse 5.

l verse 7.

m verse 8.

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or a presumptuous affirmer that I am without sin, or any other of those things of which I am slanderously reported to have been guilty. I must therefore desire the equal Reader, that if he is not already, he will learn at least to be mistrustful, and not admit of any Traditions concerning me and my Betters, from such an uncreditable Historian as giddy RUMOR: but that he will judge of other men, as every man doth judge of Trees, by the nature of the (a) fruits which are seen to grow from them; viz. the quality of their writings, and the constant Tenour of their Lives. The words of King James to his Son Henry are very apposite and suitable on this occasion. [(b) ' Principally, exercise true wisdom in discerning wisely betwixt true and false Reports: First, considering the nature of the person Reporter; next, what interest he can have in the weal or evil of him of whom he maketh the report; thirdly, the likelihood of the purpose it self; and lastly, the nature and by-past life of the delated person: and where ye find a Tattler, away with him. -- It is better to try reports, than to foster suspicion upon an honest man: for since suspicion is the Tyrants sicknesse, as the fruit of an evil conscience, potius in alteram partem peccato; I mean, in not mistrusting one, to whom no such dishonesty was known before.

a Mat. 7. 16, 20

b Bas. Aug.
l. 2. p. 99, &
100.

1.

2.

3.

4.

* Διδβολος
Diabolus.
Diable.
Diavolo.
Devil.

c Joh. 8. 44.

d Ibid.

e Correp. Corr.

Epist. Ded. 2.

p 16.

† Id. ibid. p. 17

e That Dragon was the old Serpent, the Devil and Satan, Rev. 20. 2.

It may perhaps be of use to such as are forgers of Calumny, to be told how inhumane a sin it is, and how peculiarly Diabolical. I say peculiarly Diabolical, because it hath pleased the Holy Ghost to give the Devil the name of * Devil, even from that his chief property, of raising Calumnies and framing lies. Thence said our Saviour to the Jews, "Ye are of your Father the (c) Devil, who when he speaketh a Lie, he speaketh of his own: from whence there is nothing more evident, than that the Devil is the (d) Father as well of Lyes, as of Lyes. It may also be of use to such as are able to believe the most incredible Narrations, to consider the deceitfulness of that old Proverb (to which they trust and give credence) to wit, that a great deal of smook doth argue at least some little fire: For the most impure Dunghil may smook and vapour, when yet there is not the least Fire that can be pretended to be the cause. And therefore if any man shall liken me to that (e) Dragon of (e) Hell, Rev. 12. 15. or † use to call this Copy of harm-

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harmlesse Notes, Demon Meridianum, that is, a masculine-neuter-noonday Devil, his Reader must not think so hardly of my Person, or my Papers, as to give the least credit to such Reports, till we are able to shew him some Cloven Feet.

Now because I am ascertain'd by several Authors, that my Notes and I shall be assaulted by some new Machines of the old Engineer, as soon as a Stationer shall be found of a more daring complexion, than those that hitherto have refused to thrust the Things into the light; and because it is easier of the two, to prevent a Calumny, than to expel it; and because I would abstain (as much as in me lyes) as well from every appearance, as from every kind of so great an evil, as that of raising a false Report (which I so groundedly hate, and so feelingly condemn, that if through ignorance or credulity I have wronged any man, I will, upon knowledge of any such wrong, make as ample satisfaction, as I am able to require from my Delators) I say, for these good reasons, I think it fit that I vindicate my self and others, from the least suspicion of having injur'd the late most learned and pious Primate of Armagh, whose utter dislike and rejection of all the Doctrines of Geneva, touching the points in debate betwixt my Neighbours and my self, I did publickly affirm, not without just ground and mature deliberation. For which, however I am censur'd and threatned too, yet am I not able (being innocent) either to be troubled at such unkindnesse, or to be scared with such Bugs. For first I spake what I spake (and I speak it still) to the immortal Honour of that Great Prelate, who preferred Truth before Error, although the Error was such as had first possesst him. The first point of honour is to repent us of our sins; and the next to that, is to retract our aberrations. If I had spoken without witness, I had but charitably err'd, because in *materia favorabili, non odiosa*. I said no more of my Lord Primate, than of King James, and Bishop Andrews, & Melancthon, who in the declining part of their Lives, did also change their Judgements unto the better. I said no more in effect, than that the Reverend Primate did conform his Judgement (and so professed not long before his death) to all the Fathers of the Church for the first four Centuries after Christ; as even the Adversary must grant, unlesse he will venture to accuse S. Austin's * Second. In saying, that the Primate did embrace the

* *Prosp. Aquit. in Epist. ad August. p. 886.*

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Doctrine of *Vniversal Redemption*, (which I can prove by many most *unquestionable* Persons, who had it poured into their ears by the *Primates* own mouth) I do as good as say *all*, although not *all* I have to say. And yet in saying *that*, I say no more, than that his Lordship did concur with the Evangelist *S. Iohn*, who hath delivered his *Belief* in these plain words, That *Iesus Chrſt the righteous is the propitiation for our sins; and not for our sins Onely, but Also for the sins of the WHOLE WORLD*, 1 *Ioh.* 2. 1, 2. In a word, whosoever shall appear to hold that *Negative* (which by being but a *Negative* will be *impossible* to be proved) That my Lord *Primate of Armagh* did not declare his *Rejection* of those Opinions which I *reſiſt*, and which himſelf had embraced in former times, will wrong the *memory* of the *Biſhop*, to whom in *ſingleneſſe* of affection I have done this *right*. And of what I now say, or ſaid before, I am ready and willing to give a ſatisfactory account, either *privately*, or *publickly*, to *Friends* or *Enemies*, as occasion ſhall ſerve, or need require. What I ſaid will be proved by ſeveral learned and grave *D'vines*, who had conference with the *Biſhop* upon that ſubject, and will be glad, upon juſt occasion, to *attest* the ſame under their *Hands*. And to vindicate my ſelf in this particular, as well as the *Friends* of the *Biſhop*, who are the *witneſſes* of his *change*, and of the *Biſhop* himſelf eſpecially, whole is the *happineſſe* and the *Glory* to have *profeſt* it, was one of my principal *Inducements* to give the Reader this little *Post-script*.



The End.



T H E
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D E F E N D E D

Against the *Declamatory Attempts* of cer-
tain late-printed Papers

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The Second Edition.

By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of
Brington in Northamptonshire.

Augustin. l. 6. Hypognoſticōn ad Calumn. Pelag. p. 880.

*Non miramur Vos de Nobis, id eſt, Homines de Hominibus, falſa
poſſe conſingere.*

We do not wonder that men are able to bear falſe witneſs againſt
their *Neighbours.*

L O N D O N ,
Printed for Richard Royston at the Angel in Ivie-Lane, 1658.